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INTRODUCTION
Terrell: My article is something of an analytical thought ex-
periment. My question to myself was: if I were to shatter
the liberty "atom", what might I find? Although the ef-
fort I made in the paper could be generally classified as
"conceptual analysis," it represents two fields of study
that should be differentiated: philosophy of language and
linguistic analysis. The aspect of philosophy of language
that is reflected in my piece is the separation of the defi-
nition of a term from its underlying normative theory,
the distinction between description and prescription.
Linguistic analysis, on the other hand, is a technique for
solving philosophical problems. What I have done is to
examine the issue in controversy carefully by separating
it into its conceptual elements and then reconstruct those
elements into a meaningful definition of the term in-
volved. The analysis of language is, I admit, a prelimi-
nary and not a final step in the resolution of any debate.
But it should at least bring us to some greater clarity
concerning the basic issues involved. This is particularly
true with regard to legal controversies, for the law con-
sists of language, and words are the stock in trade of all
lawyers.
I am not interested solely or even primarily in the
question, "What is the law of liberty?" I am interested in
the broader and prior question, "What is liberty?" This
latter question is conceptual in nature, and it is also
therefore a linguistic question because our concepts
travel and survive only in our language. Instead of trying
to find out what the concept of liberty meant regarding
each individual liberty mentioned in the Constitution,
such as freedom of speech, religion, or press, I instead
took on the larger task of investigating the concept of
liberty itself and the one place in the text of the Consti-
tution in which the word liberty appears: the Due Proc-
ess Clause.
With regard to Professor Kmiec's paper, I was dis-
concerted to see that in my reference to Charles Reich's
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recognition of the connections between property and lib-
erty he thought that I was endorsing Reich's political
program as well. The reason I cited Reich, and thought
it useful to do so, was because of his descriptive analysis
of the notion of a "new" property. But Reich's political
agenda I do not endorse, and apologize if I conveyed
that impression.
As for Professor Graglia's paper, he and I obviously
have a very thorough disagreement as to the usefulness
of my analytic technique, and as to the meaning of lib-
erty. Assuming that his observations about the narrow
historic meaning of liberty are correct and any more ex-
pressive analysis is wrong, it is interesting to note that a
fundamental historical error has been made on the re-
port of a speech by a famous Virginia country lawyer,
not here at Williamsburg actually but at Richmond, in
which the gentlemen stood before the gathered folk of
that time and apparently said, "Give me 'freedom from
bodily restraint' or give me death."
Professor Cass, has done us the worthy service of set-
ting out the traditional categories of constitutional inter-
pretation. But I would like to point out that none of
those categories is in fact isolated to the Constitution
necessarily. That is, all of Professor Cass' categories ap-
ply to any document that must be interpreted because it
contains language with some degree of vagueness associ-
ated with it. Thus, these categories are in fact subsets, or
more particular descriptions, of the kind of linguistic
analysis that I have employed.
Professor Komesar worries about the connection of
my definition of liberty to constitutional concepts of lib-
erty in that he believes that my analysis will be funda-
mentally incomplete until I examine the institutions asso-
ciated with the creation and protection of liberty. I do
not disagree. My aim, however, was to investigate what
those institutions were supposed to be about in some
sense. But moreover, institutional questions are also con-
sidered in a conceptual context-that is, institutional
choice may implicate our later understandings of various
definitional elements within liberty, like meaningfulness
or the distinction between liberty and license. But I
would argue that this feedback effect is not all that dra-
matic for our purposes. It seems to me that while the ex-
istence of particular liberties may at any time depend
upon institutional configurations, the concept of liberty
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itself will not change with regard to institutions, that it
will be largely independent of any particular institutional
framework if the conceptual analysis is exacting enough.
Butler: My approach has been to examine the Constitution
from a more traditional legal history perspective, after
first noting that it contains what I have characterized as a
rather meager and lackluster pantheon of basic substan-
tive guarantees of liberty. The question under analysis,
therefore, is what inference should we draw from that?
And there are at least three alternatives.
The first is based on a notion that the framers enter-
tained a homogeneous moral view. As a result, the fur-
ther inference is made by Professor Ely, among others,
that in the opinion of Jefferson-to take a notable mem-
ber of the founding generation-"We the People" can
safely trust the democratically-elected legislature to im-
plement our shared moral view as to the legitimate ends
of government and hence need not fear tyranny from
that quarter of government. I think he is clearly wrong.
For example, Jefferson observed that 173 despots, refer-
ring presumably to the number of assemblymen then sit-
ting across the way in the capitol, would be no better
than a single tyrant. Be that as it may, the group that
I've termed principled positivists, such as Justice Rehn-
quist and Professor Ely, take the position that the judici-
ary should not undertake to imply additional liberties
into the fabric of the constitutional structure, because
judges cannot perform that task responsibly-even
though these principled positivists acknowledge the exis-
tence of implicit institutional limitations on legislative
hegemony.
A second deduction from the paucity of liberties in
the Constitution is made by pragmatic positivists, who
take the position that the framers held a decidedly heter-
ogeneous view of the moral universe, given the many fac-
tions which had to be compromised in Philadelphia, and
that consequently they adopted the Hobbesian position
that there could be no unanimity on the moral goals of
the new republic. By necessity, therefore, one had to re-
pose ultimate political faith in the workings of the legisla-
ture-as constrained by procedural protections, such as
bicameralism and separation of powers. These pragmatic
positivists, such as Holmes and Frankfurter, have con-
ceded none the less that the judiciary does retain some
role in fleshing out the contours of certain personal lib-
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erties in the Constitution. But in their role as dispensers
of constitutional equity, these pragmatic positivists have
taken a very deprecatory view of the equities on behalf
of most citizen claims of a socio-economic nature, while
demonstrating a remarkable sympathy for the competing
claims of the state.
A third view is that of the due process absolutists,
who would like the Court to flesh out and absolutize,
new personal liberties ad libertum.
Well, Jefferson has been criticized by Leonard Levy,
among others, because historical research indicates that
even he, the great libertarian, did not feel that a specific
guarantee like freedom of speech should have been an
absolute. That paradox supports my notion of the as-
sumed constitutional role of the local jury in fleshing out,
through both civil and criminal trials, the implied terms
of the social contract. Through jury decisions the exis-
tence of the necessarily unspecifiable set of liberties ad-
verted to in the Ninth Amendment was to be vindicated.
Why necessarily unspecifiable? Because while Jefferson
and the other libertarian framers acknowledged the exis-
tence of immutable principles of fairness and justice,
they recognized that the application of these principles
over time would be mutable. In other words, what is fair
and reasonable governmental conduct in 1791 may not
be what is fair and reasonable in 1984. Who makes this
transition? The institution chosen, I suggest, was the
jury. In the First Amendment freedom of speech area,
for instance, the jury would decide whether or not
speech, which is sought to be criminalized or punished,
entails "a clear and present danger" to the state. The
jury would make this decision, not the judge, after the
judge has decided whether as a matter of law the speed
in question is protected. The jury gives the defendant
"two hits" at the cherry. During the nineteenth century,
the jury's role in finding the applicable law in criminal
cases was arrogated by judges. But judges are not suited
to make these ad hoc equitable decisions, because very
soon institutional fatigue sets in. The Supreme Court
doesn't have the manpower to make ad hoc judgments
about the fundamental fairness of punishing individual
defendants. The result it that, after awhile, the court de-
cided to go one way or the other: either they will absolu-
tize protection in a particular area or they will abdicate.
For instance, we know that in the area of representation,
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the Court decided to absolutize in the direction of "one
man, one vote." And in the area of political speech, they
have decided to absolutize by not engaging in ad hoc re-
view so that basically anything goes.
But as an institution, the jury can do the balancing
that is required to see whether, as a matter of fairness
and reasonableness, our liberties are being violated. For
the state to punish someone, there first has to be a law.
The fact that there is a law, however, does not necessa-
rily mean that a jury can't dispense with it, or except an
individual from its operation, if it finds that the law is
inequitable or fundamentally unfair as applied. How does
jury nullification of the law differ from judicial nullifica-
tion? It's better because jury nullification leaves the law
formally intact, whereas judicial nullification means that
the law and the whole statutory scheme are destroyed.
Because jury nullification is less drastic medicine, it is
more apt to be administered.
As Professor Reid has documented, it was the civil
traverse jury during the Revolution that was the chief
weapon of the Whigs in fighting Tory repression. How
did they do it? By bringing suits against officials who
were administering obnoxious laws. If the jury was con-
vinced that a law was fundamentally unfair as applied, it
would find that the statute afforded no protection or im-
munity to the official, and as a result the individual
would receive discrete compensation for governmental
tyranny. Thus my basic program is to restore the civil
jury as a means of constitutional redress against the gov-
ernment for depredations against the innumerable, in-
tangible liberties preserved to the people by the Ninth
Amendment. In that way the civil jury offers a constitu-
tional halfway house between the positivists who would
limit constitutional liberties to those which are textually
or structurally apparent and the absolutists who would
trust 5 of 9 unelected judges to intuit an evolving num-
ber of absolute new liberties. The unanimous jury, as the
dispenser of democratic equity, vindicates liberty on a re-
tail basis, without at the same having to invalidate an en-
tire statutory scheme.
Kmiec: What we have are two authors' very exhaustive and
very legitimate attempts to understand what liberty is
presently, not what it may have been historically or what
it ought to be. With that in mind let's take a look first at
Professor Terrell's contribution. We are told that some-
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thing called the "new liberty" is the predicate to new
property. I think that is something of a chicken-and-egg
proposition. It may very well be the other way around,
such that the increasing refusal of society to protect
property and property rights may, in fact, be largely the
cause of the decline of liberty in our society. As you may
recall, "new property" is Yale Law Professor Charles
Reich's bad idea which should have been forgotten long
ago, but which, nevertheless, suggests that there can be
no retreat from the ever-expanding public-interest state
for among other reasons various corporate abuses. Now,
I dispute Reich's notion because I think he all too easily
fails to recognize that what he characterizes as one man's
abuse is actually another man's liberty. With respect to
corporate abuse, it may suffice to say that there has been
an enormous amount of academic work that illustrates
that corporations are no more than the individuals which
comprise them and that corporations, in fact, serve valu-
able economic purposes in maximizing -ealth and mini-
mizing transactions costs, thereby making them a sizable
economic plus and not a justification for diminishing our
liberty.
Yet the new liberty is less than old liberty because it
is premised on confiscation and redistribution, which are
just other wrongs. Professor Terrell stated that his pur-
pose was to define liberty and not to accede to Professor
Reich's political agenda. I think that's problematic.
There are indications that Professor Terrell still sub-
scribes to the ultimate conclusion that Reich is pushing.
Namely, Terrell states that "Just as Reich's property was
government-related, consisting of various forms of lar-
gesse such as licenses, subsidies, and welfare payments, so
too our new liberty is a centralized and politicized con-
cept." "However," Terrell continues, "this could be
viewed as primarily negative or primarily positive: one
focuses on the dramatically expanded role of govern-
ment in creating constraints on our actions; the other
emphasizes the creation by government of new opportu-
nities for individual choice." I have a great deal of diffi-
culty recognizing the positive aspect of government lar-
gesse since I can't remember the last time government
augmented individual choice. Acceptance of a Reichian
thesis ultimately leads Professor Terrell to the erroneous
conclusion that old and new liberty can be equated.
There are obvious costs to liberty in this sense. Economic
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liberty is diminished because resources are allocated
through the state on totally non-economic grounds. Inev-
itably, the allocation of resources by the state goes to tre-
mendously non-productive activity. New liberty also has
a cost for political liberty, because such liberty can be
lessened at the whim and caprice of the State by continu-
ous reallocations of state-controlled new property. This
was a problem that Reich, himself, couldn't solve by cre-
ating enormous due process mechanisms. It is also a
problem that is not particularly well solved by Professor
Butler's jury and its substantive compensatory role. At
bottom, the notion of new liberty really distorts the con-
cept of liberty. It distorts liberty in the sense that it sug-
gests that one can only be "at liberty" when one is free
from all types of restraints, even those attributable to
wealth and moral suasion.
Turning briefly to Professor Butler's paper, he
reveals in his historical searching that he's very troubled
by the existing state of liberty. Thus, he turns to the jury
as a substantive protector of liberty. I think the jury has
its own problems, however. It is merely a different organ
of the state. Moreover, it is clear that Professor Butler
accepts a role for the jury in limiting not only invasive
conduct but also noninvasive conduct. He suggests that
this may be justified on the basis of what we gave up in
the social contract. But it has been well shown that, if
individuals did not have the capability to control
noninvasive conduct in the state of nature, there is no
logic that suggests that they can control it as a collective.
My own conclusion is that the jury can be just as tyranni-
cal as other public bodies. Professor Butler says the jury
would work better than judges or legislators, but in my
opinion that doesn't say a great deal. Professor Butler
seems to suggest that juries are more detached, more eq-
uitable, more likely to award compensation. However,
there are a number of studies cited in my paper which
suggest that the jury is just as likely to agree with the
judge; in fact, in one sample, they were found to agree
three-fourths of the time.
Despite these disagreements, I believe the principal
papers make an important contribution; namely, that the
concept of liberty is best defined by looking at human
action. Terrell does this by suggesting that we should de-
fine liberty in terms of a "life plan". His suggestion re-
minds me of Thomas Aquinas' well-known proposition
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that one should seek the good and avoid the evil. It also
suggests to me Robert Nozick's notion that liberty is re-
lated to entitlements: the entitlements that one has in
oneself by natural necessity as well as in the. things that
one acquires by legitimate acquisition or rectification for
wrongs.
Thus, in conclusion, my own view is that the way to
define liberty-old or new-is in relation to old prop-
erty, which maintains the independence, dignity and plu-
ralism of society by creating zones in which the majority
has to yield, whether that majority is represented by the
legislator, the judge or even the jury. Liberty does not
result by pretending that state privileges are liberty or
that twelve individuals will have the courage occasionally
to make up for outrageous infringements of human na-
ture and development.
Graglia: I see an interesting philosophical paper by Professor
Terrell, but it is not very useful in constitutional law.
The analysis is so complex and difficult to follow that it is
not likely to be usable in a legal context. But, more fun-
damental, we really don't have a problem of defining lib-
erty at all in constitutional law. In law, of course, basi-
cally what we're trying to do is to govern the future by
rules. The rules necessarily are groups of words. But you
have a real problem when you try later to apply those
words to disputes, the problem of what those words
mean. Nothing is more disappointing than how little help
you get from philosophers or philosophers of language.
They don't know what meaning means either.
I notice that Professor Terrell toys with natural law
ideas. He is worried that the Supreme Court and Paul v.
Davis suggest that "liberty" has no independent sub-
stance whatsoever other than being a concept derived
entirely from existing positive legal sources. But I sug-
gest that Jeremy Bentham was right in his perception
that natural law is not only nonsense but nonsense on
stilts. It is not helpful to apply the "concept of liberty" to
constitutional law because there is no constitutional
problem that arises from inability or difficulty in figuring
out what we really mean by "liberty".
What does it mean to say that neither the state nor
the federal government shall deprive any person of life,
liberty or property except by the due process of law? In
terms of history, or indeed in terms of plain language,
this is not difficult to understand. It means quite simply
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that the state may not execute a person, imprison him, or
take his land except by ordinary legal procedures. And
that, of course, is a very important step in the history of
human freedom. The state must behave according to es-
tablished legal procedures - what the law is, what the
legislatures create.
A problem arises only if you try to make the due
process requirement a limitation on the legislature. Be-
ginning about 1890, this happened, and it was given the
pejorative name of "substantive due process". Under it,
the Court found ways to stop the welfare state, to stop
social and economic experimentation, and to do it in the
name of the Due Process Clause. It was not a very sensi-
ble claim, but the need was felt to be great. And in the
history of constitutional law, when the Supreme Court
feels the need is great, it acts. The need was felt to be
great, for example, to disallow segregation in the schools
of Washington, D.C., and so the Supreme Court told us
that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause did that.
But the idea of substantive due process got the
Court into trouble with the New Deal. It almost brought
the Court to grief. The Court escaped relatively un-
scathed, however, perhaps even strengthened, with the
arrival of the New Deal justices, the Blacks, the
Douglases, the Murphys, the Rutledges. And all that re-
ally came from it was the bad name of substantive due
process. One was to never again use the language of sub-
stantive due process; one was to behave like a good,
proper judge and not be a super-legislator. But, of
course, that lasted only as long as it took for a case to
appear before the Court that the new justices felt
strongly about. As for substantive due process, the Court
hit upon three ways to avoid talking about it. First, Hugo
Black discovered that the Fourteenth Amendment was
meant to make the Bill of Rights applicable to the states.
This opened enormous new possibilities for imposing re-
straints on the states in the name of the Bill of Rights. If
that proved not to be enough, Douglas, who wasn't quite
as literal as Black, said the Court should also enforce
"the penumbra" of the Bill of Rights when necessary.
The second major move was the discovery of the Equal
Protection Clause and all the marvels that lay therein.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was found to require, for example, "one man, one
vote," despite the fact all the rest of the Fourteenth
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Amendment made perfectly clear that this was not
intended.
Finally, Justice Brennan discovered that it was ok for
the Court to substitute its policy views for the legislature
as long as it claimed to be enforcing only "procedural"
rights, not "substantive" rights. In the history of consti-
tutional law during the last thirty or so years, when
something really intellectually disreputable was to be
done, you gave it to Brennan. In the practice of law, the
main question is how shameless are you. What is you em-
barrassment threshold? What can't you argue? The ques-
tion, I tell my students, is, "At what point would you
hide your head in your jacket and snicker?" If you can
keep your face straight, it's a good argument. So, it de-
pends on your ingenuity in argument and your embar-
rassment threshold. Brennan, I think, has the highest
embarrassment threshold in the history of the Supreme
Court. Much higher than that of Douglas, whose impulse
was just to say: Look, why don't you guys just do as I say
because it's right, because I tell you it's right and you can
take my word for it. Brennan's impulse is to "explain" in
detail why all his policy notions are constitutional
commands.
Cass: I think it's important to try to put in context the notion
of liberty in constitutional law. Quite clearly, liberty in
its usual sense was a value embraced by those who
framed and ratified the Constitution. Almost everything
in the Constitution may be seen as intended to promote
liberty. Government power is restrained in all sorts of
different ways: the ex post facto prohibition, requirements
for proof of treason, and amendments guaranteeing free-
dom of religion and speech and so on all restrain govern-
ment (or intend to) and so contribute to liberty. Perhaps
the most important protection of liberty in the Constitu-
tion was the division of power among the three branches
of government, and on the legislative side, a division of
power among the two Houses in such a way that you
have different compositions and different incentives to
the people involved. By making it more difficult to gov-
ern, you give much greater protection to liberty than
you would by an explicit guarantee.
Having said this, it seems to me very difficult to look
at the Constitution and to find it enshrining liberty as an
ultimate good. Liberty in a generic sense is contradicted
by a variety of things in the Constitution. After all, the
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Constitution was designed in large measure to give the
central government much greater power than it had
under the Articles of the Confederation. Moreover, the
creation of the two-house legislature was a compromise
between the New Jersey Plan and the Virginia Plan. And
each of those plans was put forth not to create liberty of
the highest order, but to serve the self-interest of the
people in those states. Those from Virginia wanted a na-
tional legislature that would give them the greatest
chance of controlling it. And those from New Jersey and
the smaller states wanted a governmental organization
that gave the larger states less and smaller state more
likelihood for control of the federal government. You
can see in arguments over the Constitution and in the
history of that time that people were not committed to
liberty, but would use whatever power they had to op-
press others. The greatest defenders of "liberty," people
such as Thomas Jefferson, were opposed to absolute lib-
erty for all; clearly they wanted the liberty to oppress
others.
What this means in the constitutional context is that
there is no general commitment to liberty; instead, there
is a series of compromises borne out of interest in per-
sonal aspects of liberty, out of self-interest. The conflict
among divergent self-interests is not soluble by means of
any general analysis of what liberty is, what it means, or
how it can be protected. I -think that's true both as to
substance and to process. Not only can we not define lib-
erty in a way that makes these definitional issues disap-
pear, we also can't describe any single best process for
protecting liberty. While the major protection of liberty
is the power-sharing arrangement, we will intervene
through courts, and through juries on occasion, to pro-
tect certain very specific aspects of liberty. Much needs
to be done to identify exactly what occasions are proper
ones for judicial intervention, exactly what principles
should inform resolution of particular conflicting inter-
ests in liberty, and what form of intervention is appropri-
ate in specific contexts. When we get beyond these ques-
tions to the more abstract question of what is "liberty,"
we have reached the realm where discourse becomes
quite difficult, and I think not terribly fruitful.
Komesar: It seems to me that we are promoting the idea that
there are multiple conceptions of liberty. But how much
do any of these conceptions tell us about the Constitu-
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tion? We have to conceive of a means to carry out
whatever conception of liberty we may have. To be sure,
there is no comparative institutional analysis without def-
inition of a goal. As such, it is important to discuss goals
like liberty. I think the greatest frustration in my own
work has been to learn how little actual results have
come from the vast amounts of literature attempting to
define goals.
Tim Terrell's paper takes on the difficult task of de-
fining a broad based conception of liberty as a goal. But
the apparatus he constructs is so enormous and so un-
wieldy as, I think, not to be useful. There are two parts
to the analysis I suggest: the definition of a goal and the
definition of institutions and their comparisons. But the
process is not done in isolation. We must be able to ask
questions about modern institutional choice. When we
ask what is good constitutional law?, or even what is con-
stitutional law? We must recognize the central reality of
institutional choice and its role in forming our concep-
tion of constitutional rights and even its role in forming
our conception of liberty.
Terrell: With regard to Doug Kmiec's comments, he suggests
that my definition of liberty is not useful, but he reaches
this conclusion not because of my descriptive exercise,
but because he has raised a normative issue. That is, he
wants the term liberty to mean something in particular,
specifying at one point that we should understand liberty
in relation to the "old" property. But that is not the ex-
ercise in which I was primarily engaged, which was to try
to understand liberty in its largest context.
This also relates directly to the issue raised by Neil
Komesar-the idea that neither definition of goals nor
definition of institutions takes place in a conceptual vac-
uum. I agree, but my conceptual analysis represents an
attempt at least to structure the debate about what our
goals are. For example, if your goal is simply to "maxi-
mize liberty," that by itself is rather meaningless; but if
we understand our goal as "maximizing choices," then we
can begin to focus on more specific substantive issues.
Professor Graglia has raised some very important
points that tie in with Ron Cass's comments. His point
that law does not come from sources other than positive
sources is one of the most fundamental and difficult juris-
prudential issues that we face. That is, what is "law?" Or,
more particularly, what is "constitutional law?" According
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to Professors Graglia and Cass, the term liberty in the
Due Process Clause is a different term than that used in
the Preamble or perhaps in the Declaration of Indepen-
dence. That is an interesting linguistic point, with inter-
esting implications. That is, if the "liberty" in the Due
Process Clause is only about imprisonment, does that
mean that it is not about the other substantive liberties
specified in the Constitution? I find that rather
disturbing.
Even the most famous of modern legal positivists ac-
cepts the fact that language and words do not create pre-
cise images; they create fuzzy images. In The Concept of
Law, H.L.A. Hart discusses the inherent open texture of
language that dictates that all statutes will inevitably ap-
ply to a range of actual instances. This in turn means
that the language of the Bill of Rights will also have an
open texture, that these rights will have "penum-
bra's"-which is exactly the word that Hart used. Be-
cause of vague uses of language, the notion that the Bill
of Rights means something absolutely specific in every
instance is impossible to defend. It seems to me unten-
able that "religion" or "speech" mean specific things.
Furthermore, you should note that the creation of a new
right, like "privacy," from these "penumbras" is not the
product simply of a linguistic-definitional exercise, but it
requires the use of some normative agenda. It is there-
fore useful to recognize the difference between these two
exercises: one which simply tries to find out what a word
may mean in a central case, and the other to find out
what you want it to mean because of some set of values
you want to impose.
Butler: Doug Kmiec picks up on my suggestion in the paper
that the jury is a sort of halfway house between two dif-
ferent approaches. The jury provides the neutral princi-
ples. That is, on a procedural basis, what emerges from
the jury's deliberation becomes our definition of liberty.
The jury is an empirical process for determining, under
changing circumstances, what our immutable principles
of fairness and justice properly mean. Take the example
of the Penn Central case, in which New York City passed
an historical zoning statute that said Penn Central
couldn't build above the existing facade of the Grand
Central Terminal because of its unique aesthetics.
Justice Brennan acknowledged Penn Central's con-
tention that its activity was non-harmful and non-inva-
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sive, but then he asks, "Who's to say that it is not harmful
conduct?" In a fit of judicial agnosticism, Brennan, sug-
gests that the failure to provide benefit may constitute a
harm, because New Yorkers wants to see this building so
badly, etc. If you had a jury in this case, that is, if you
had someone putatively disinterested, you could say to
them: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, was it reasona-
ble for Penn Central to expect, under all the attendant
circumstances, that it would be allowed to alter the
facade in this way? And the State could argue the same
point they argued to the court, that the inefficiency of
Penn Central's proposed use of the property would cause
a legally cognizable harm-that Penn Central was trying
to "perpetrate an inefficiency." And if you can sell that
argument to a unanimous jury of twelve, good luck. But
I say, whatever arguments are to be advanced, submit to
a jury the basic politics-ethical question whether what
Penn Central wants to do is harmful in the sense that it
should be both prohibited from doing it and denied
compensation?
Doug, though, clings to the protection of physical
property. My suggestion does introduce the possibility
that a jury may find that an individual's non-invasive use
of his property is nevertheless somehow harmful based
on community standards, i.e., commonly accepted stan-
dards of what is neighborly conduct. For instance, an
inefficiency might be so palpable and gross that it would
be considered to be impermissible even though non-inva-
sive. But how sacred is it when today the State can build
an improvement in your neighborhood, create a special
tax assessment district, and have an ad valorem tax levied
on your physical property, which you may be unable to
pay? There goes your sacred physical property. Histori-
cally, in 1791 the practice was to have an ad quod
damnum jury of twelve people make all special tax assess-
ments. Also in 1791, the pervasive practice in just com-
pensation law was to have this jury decide how much
compensation one was entitled to. What happened to the
ad quod damnum jury? The railroads, who enjoyed the vi-
carious power of eminent domain, convinced the legisla-
tures, beginning in Pennsylvania, that, since juries tend
to award too much money, it was better to appoint a
commission to assess damages. The railroads quickly cap-
tured the commission. A great popular protest went up
that this violated state analogues to the Seventh Amend-
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ment; but, of course, the democratic legislature insisted
that this was in the true interest of the public. By restor-
ing the right to a jury in matters of taxation, regulation,
and condemnation, we have more effective compensable
liberties than we do by clinging to the illusory belief in
the sanctity of physical property.
As for the institutional qualities of the jury, I think
that it has a number of advantages. Normatively, a signif-
icant point of my paper was to relate the model of the
jury to the eighteenth-century moral-sense school of phi-
losophy on the basis of the assumption that it assumes
that a jury of twelve people would be able to recognize,
on the basis of aesthetic judgment, when a fundamental
injustice was being perpetrated by the government. The
jury is also a better institution for this purpose than the
appellate courts because judges are subject to institu-
tional pressures that may bias their determination.
Therefore, equity should not be administered by judges;
equity should be administered by a disinterested group
of jurors.
I. THE PLACE OF LIBERTY IN A STRUCTURE OF CONFLICTS
AND CONSTRAINTS
Cass: It's important to discuss some of the distinctions about
how people go about reading constitutional text. If you
asked, what was meant by the term liberty when it was
put into the Constitution, I would say that probably -
and I can't emphasize the word probably too much - it
meant simply freedom from physical restraint. If you
wanted to ask a different question, not what was histori-
cally intended, but how ought we now look at this, then
maybe my answer would be different. Maybe I would say
that we should put the Fifth Amendment into the Due
Process Clause, since we've read the Privileges and Im-
munities Clause out of the Fourteenth Amendment and
since it's important to me to protect freedom of speech
in some respect. But I'd like to emphasize two points.
One is that the question of what we ought to do involves
a very particular sort of analysis. It's not a definitional
analysis. Of course, the meaning of the term "liberty"
plays a role. But I'm asking, what ought we to do? I'm
not asking, what do we mean by the term? That may be a
part of my thinking. It may constrain my thinking in
some sense, and it certainly may constrain the courts; but
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when someone says that we ought to begin by thinking
about what the term "liberty" means today, I want to
know why. Why should I care what it means today, as
distinct from what it meant when the Constitution was
written? The real questions are: What ought we to do,
what principles should we advance, and how should we
advance them? Second, I think that, to answer these
questions, you are invariably driven to very particular
sub-issues; you can't answer them at the meta-level.
Every real issue in law depends not on the definition, not
on our agreement on some abstract formulation of
words, but on what you might call theoretical
implication.
Graglia: Nothing illustrates Ron Cass' point better, I think,
than the debate on the Equal Rights Amendment in the
Senate. The question was, who's in favor of equal rights
for women, and virtually everybody put up their hand.
After all, who's against equality and equal rights in this
country? Once it was settled that everybody was in favor
of equal rights for women, that you shouldn't discrimi-
nate on the basis of sex, the very next question was,
should we draft women? And the Senate voted no. It just
illustrates that when you go from the abstract - so ab-
stract as to be hardly meaningful - to the specific agree-
ment is less easy.
Another point: Does the meaning of the word derive
from the result, or does the result derive from the mean-
ing, or is there an interplay? Congress can regulate inter-
state commerce; so, we have to decide what is and what
is not interstate commerce. And we see that Congress
regulates a lot of things. Now, can Congress regulate
those things because they're interstate commerce, or are
those things interstate commerce because Congress can
regulate them? Consider some seemingly very clear and
specific words "man" and "woman". A person sued to
play tennis in the women's division of the U.S. Open,
And a state court judge said, yes, you may, because you
really are a woman. I found this fascinating because of
the famous statement illustrating the omnipotence of
Parliament, that Parliament can do anything except
make a man a woman. Hell, in this country even a lower
state court judge can do that. Was the person allowed to
play because the person was a woman, or was the person
a woman, at least legally, because allowed to play? This
example illustrates how small a role the word can play,
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because there are few concepts, I would say, that are
clearer than the difference between man and woman.
The meaning of what is "interstate commerce" or
"property" is determined by what the courts do. The
words provide only as much restraint as the judges wish
to have, which today is very little. What then, determines
what Congress can regulate as interstate commerce? All
one can say is: How its court resolves the conflicting in-
terests involved that cause us to have this problem in the
first place, the interest in, say, an efficient national mar-
ket versus the is local autonomy. Today judges think that
an efficient national market is much more important
than local autonomy so anything can be "interstate com-
merce." Evaluation of its conflicting interests-a policy
judgment-determines the decision, and the decision de-
termines the meaning of the words.
Kmiec: I think Tim Terrell is putting too much into the defi-
nitional category. In allocating some things to the de-
scriptive or definitional and some things to the theoreti-
cal and ethical, he gets some of the classifications wrong.
Nevertheless, the most important thing is that he is will-
ing to ask the question: Is there a way to decide whether
or not something ought to be in the definitional category
or whether something ought to be in the ethical cate-
gory? A tautology-that the law is the law because the
law is the law-is insufficient in any ethical sense. It is
most insufficient for anyone trying to live within a consti-
tutional government. It doesn't really give one much
comfort that someone has asserted, either through force
of vote or force of arms, that something is law.
Butler: We say that property connotes facts but denotes legal
consequences. So, in reading Tim Terrell's piece, I asked
myself, what is the real organizing principle that keeps
items within the large circle known as property? He
points out that peripheral cases within the circle of lib-
erty may bear no resemblance to one another. In other
words, they may share no common element, but -they
may be within the circle of liberty because they share an
element in common with the hypothetical central case.
Arguably, then, the question has become: What institu-
tion decides in the first place to confer the legal protec-
tion which then spells protected liberty? And, of course,
for me that institution should include the jury. But my
article ties into Tim's in the further sense-and I think
it's significant-that his analysis will help lawyers struc-
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ture their analogical arguments to the jury. That is, does
this person deserve to do what he wants to do under the
rubric of liberty? And in reasoning through this question
in an analogical fashion, which is the only way twelve
people off the street are used to reasoning, lawyers on
both sides would employ precisely the sort of model Tim
suggests.
Komesar: I am interested in knowing what it is that I observe
in the Constitution or constitutional law. Everyone
agrees that we want liberty. It is like a shopping list: we
want many things. The real test comes when you have to
put your budget constraint next to the shopping list.
Then comes the battle over meanings. Now, suppose we
see the Constitution as a means of telling who won the
battle. That is, we know that there is a conflict between
notions of what liberty should mean and whose interest
should be protected. Given the constraints of society,
how will these conflicts be resolved? Which forms of lib-
erty will be or ought to be paramount? It may be that in
some instances it is best to keep the government out, and
while in others it is best to rely heavily on government.
Under these circumstances, I cannot judge what liberty is
by looking at what liberty has come to mean in two
clauses of the Constitution. My observation of the Consti-
tution has to be a great deal more sophisticated than
talking about what liberty has come to mean under these
two provisions, because the term is used in a very narrow
fashion, that is, protection of a group of people or of an
individual against the government. But if we had a so-
phisticated perception, it might be that there are
broader forms of liberty best protected by government.
This institutional choice - government's role is central.
Graglia: The question is: Do results define the word or does a
definition of the word determine the results in law? It
seems to me that the answer is the former. Results define
the word. What then determines the results? The decid-
ers' view of the conflicting interests determines the re-
sults. Now, what role, if any, does the word play in this?
All I can say is that, the way courts operate today, the
word provides very little restraint. Of course if a word
can mean anything, communication is impossible, and
that is in fact the situation in "constitutional" law today;
there is no communication between the Constitution and
the Supreme Court.
Now, Neil Komesar is wrong in saying that the Con-
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stitution represents a vast array of value choices. Realisti-
cally considered, the Constitution tells us nothing about
almost any real social problem. It tells us we can't have a
thirty-four year old president and that we can't have for-
eign-born Henry Kissinger as president, but those aren't
problems. Neil is operating as if we have this magnificent
collection of restraints on government, but just look at
the Bill of Rights. The Second Amendment for example,
gives us some kind of right to bear arms in connection
with a "well-regulated militia". Yet Who brings that up
today except opponents of gun control? Certainly not the
ACLU, which otherwise keeps telling us that the Bill of
Rights is marvelous. Who needs this amendment? If it re-
ally meant that a city could not ban firearms, I would say
that proves again that constitutional restrictions are a
mistake. Happily, the Constitution in fact restricts very
little, so little that real constitutional problems almost
never come up. I have never seen an unconstitutional law
except once, and the Supreme Court held that one
constitutional.
Terrell: Lino Graglia has come down, I think, fairly hard on
the proposition that results determine words. And what
determines results? Conflicting interests. Thus, he says,
words have no important function in this drama. I disa-
gree. How does one frame the interests in the first place?
Words are the method by which we frame the conflicting
interests whose competion the results then reflect. One
could have the impression, of course, from reading Su-
preme Court decisions that results determine words, but
that is only because of the power of language and words
to define the issues in the first place. The best example, I
suppose, in the Constitution is the definition of the term
"speech." That term now includes all sorts of things that
have nothing to do with actual verbal, spoken communi-
cation. So, it would seem obvious that in some instances
words are bandied about with no one paying any particu-
lar attention to their "definition". But note that in mak-
ing this point, you are implicitly criticizing this method
of operation, and that is because you have some sense of
what it means when, to return to your example, you use
the words "man" and "woman." You already have some
definition of these words in your mind. How else could
you communicate?
Graglia: I really have no interest in whether altered males get
to play in the women's division of U.S. tennis. What of-
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fends me is that I am governed by Harry Blackmun. I
think it is shameful that the basic rules as to my life in
this society are made by people like Blackmun, by the
majority vote of a small committee of lawyers unelected
and holding office for life. Lawyers, for goodness sake!
People who avoided education by going to law school;
people trained in trickiness, their only area of expertise.
These people are making important rules, literally of life
and death, governing my life. But I am supposed to be
living in a representative democracy. Now, that's my
agenda. If we got more specific, that's what I'd complain
about.
The plain and simple fact is that the Constitution
has nothing to do with constitutional law; it does not
bear on any problems that actually arise. What this
means is that the decisions are made entirely by judges,
not by the Constitution. The only question worth discuss-
ing therefore is, should judges be making those deci-
sions? I don't like leaving the decisions to them. Brennan
and Marshall and Douglas are just human beings who are
willing to decide anything, only people with a high de-
gree of self-confidence. Douglas just knew that if we let
him make all the decisions, we'd get better government.
Kmiec: I agree with Lino Graglia that results do define the
word. Then the question is: What results are right? Lino
tells us there are conflicting claims. I think in order to
weigh those conflicting claims, we have to come fully to
grips with a particular normative base. We have to iden-
tify whether that normative base is consistent and not
subject to contradiction. I think that old property does
that for us; and I think that natural law does that for us
to some degree.
My fundamental difficulty with George Butler's
proposition for the jury is that it doesn't address the nor-
mative question head-on. Instead, his proposition leaves
it to these twelve good men and true to do the best that
they can from time to time; and he suggests we will be
better off. However, the pragmatic jury can sit back like
many planning and zoning commissions and boards of
adjustment currently do and say: Well, maybe we want
an individual to provide a benefit for us, and we don't
want to pay for it. I think juries run a great danger of
not being disinterested arbiters of the social contract, but
instead just another vehicle for taking property from
others without compensation. In Indiana, where we still
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believe in the Constitution, our juries may be standard
bearers of an objective normative system; they may know
right from wrong, and may decide correctly. But out in
California, where the People's Republic exists, forget it.
Cass: Lino Graglia made the point that the Constitution
doesn't really tell you anything or that what it tells is re-
ally not worth telling. I disagree. I think the Constitution
sometimes tells us things quite clearly, and they may be
important. Take, for instance, the First Amendment's
speech clause. Two things are clear: one is that among
the exercises of governmental power with which we are
peculiarly concerned are those that interfere with
speech. The Amendment does not explain why that is so,
in what class of cases, or what the operative function of
this prohibition is. But it is an important matter to know
that interference with speech is at least a flag, a signal
for concern. Second, while it is not clear what abridg-
ment is or what freedom of speech is, the First Amend-
ment does make plain that we are talking about the law-
making power of Congress. This is the type of
governmental action to which the proscription attaches.
Of course, these two plain lessons in the First Amend-
ment have received very different treatment. Interfer-
ence with speech is regarded as special. We have not
fully worked out the borders between speech and "non-
speech" but for a broad range of controversies over the
substance of the constitutional provision this simply is
not an issue. On the other hand, we have paid no atten-
tion to the fact that by its terms the First Amendment
reaches only congressional lawmaking. There may be
good reason for ignoring the text, but that does not
make any less clear.
Tim Terrell would look to text and begin analysis of
it with abstract inquiry into key words' meaning. He says
that the reason we have to engage in definition going
down to the different elements of liberty is because it
gets us to the theoretical issues and to the normative de-
bate. I can't help feeling that this is playing with
shadows. When we go about arguing over definition, we
are really arguing about applications. Each one of us has
different situations, different hypotheticals, different real
cases, that we are concerned about. I think the defini-
tional approach miscasts the debate. We ought to move
directly to arguing over what is in our minds. What
should we do in the different situations that each of us is
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thinking about? How should those situations be treated
in our use of the Constitution?
As for juries, George Butler tells me that they pro-
tect liberty. But I want to know whose liberty is being
protected, under what circumstances, and why we think
it is a good thing? It is quite clear to me that the jury will
not protect my liberty in every instance. Judges will do
much better in some instances, particularly when you
look at who comprises juries. They are not an even cross-
section of the population. Anyone who has been asked to
serve on a jury has a good idea why they are not an even
cross-section. So, before I know whether we want to use
them or not, I need to be told what it is we want them to
do. We are not really talking about protecting liberty
versus not protecting it. We have conflicts among liber-
ties - yours and mine.
II. ALLOCATING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PROTECTION OF
LIBERTY
Komesar: The argument in my paper is that given a broad
definition of liberty such as Tim Terrell's a great deal
hinges on the modes of protecting and, therefore, on is-
sues about liberty the allocation of responsibility to gov-
ernment. Hence, a great deal of what is the police power,
what Congress is given to do, is, in fact, a responsibility
to protect liberty, as broadly defined by Tim. It has be-
come conventional to talk about protection of liberty
narrowly. I believe that protection of liberty is the pro-
tection of somebody, from somebody, by somebody. And
it is not always from the government that the person or
entity is to be protected. Often the protector is the gov-
ernment. The question really comes down to when you
want one entity to protect and when you want another. I
also think that, we make a mistake if we limit that inter-
pretations of the constitution to simplified notions of the
images the framers might have had at the particular mo-
ment. We must look instead to possible needs they felt in
putting the provisions into place.
Butler: Liberty, I agree with Holmes, is the hypostasis of a
prophecy of what you can get away with. What will the
courts let you get away with? Or, in my case, what will
the jury let you get away with? And how do you frame
the debate? You frame the question to the jury using the
term "liberty." What should a person be allowed to get
19851
JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY
away with? What should he be at liberty to do under the
implicit contemporary terms of the social contract? And I
make a distinction from the procedures adopted during
the nineteenth century, whereby judges arrogated au-
thority from the jury in many areas, but particularly in
the area of interpretation of contracts. These judges
took away from the jury their historic right to flesh out
the implicit terms of a one-on-one commercial context. It
was thought that the jury's normative input was inappro-
priate in a commercial setting, because the parties, in this
discrete transaction, were able to set out in great detail
all the relevant terms of their agreement and should be
encouraged to do so. My observation is that this practice
is totally inappropriate in the context of the social con-
tract. It is not a discrete commercial contract. We aren't
able in advance to put all the terms down on paper. The
framers recognized that. They drafted the Ninth
Amendment, which says in essence that the Parol Evi-
dence Rule is inappropriate in construing a social con-
tract. There is a pantheon of unspecifiable liberties out
there. How are those liberties identified and applied in
discrete cases? By the jury. And so, your confidence as a
citizen in undertaking any economic enterprise stems
from the fact that, if the government ever tries to tell
you "no," you have the opportunity to convince a jury of
twelve fellow citizens that you had a reasonable expecta-
tion, under the circumstances, of being allowed to
continue.
Doug Kmiec, however, is troubled by the fact that
maybe standards are different in California. Who knows
what a jury of twelve people in California would do? It's
impossible to predict. But if you don't like California eq-
uity, then I suggest you move to Maine, where you might
be better able to predict what a jury of twelve solid, not
to say stolid, peers would do. We have the phenomenon,
of course, in the Bankruptcy Act that, despite the provi-
sion that Congress shall promulgate a uniform rule of
bankruptcy, it has been interpreted to contemplate the
possibility that diverse state exemption laws can be
adopted by Congress as part of national act. An exemp-
tion that's appropriate in Texas, a homestead or a farm,
may not be appropriate in a more commercialized juris-
diction like New York. That's the sort of diversity the
jury provides, and I think it's conducive of liberty.
Cass: George Butler in large measure brings us a choice be-
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tween the judge and the jury. But I think that's the
wrong issue. It's not just a choice between judges and ju-
ries; it comes down to a variety of different things and in
different contexts. We're willing to take liberty away, but
the important question is, who gets to do it? The social
contract, if you want to read the Constitution as a con-
tract of sorts, gives the decision to individuals, to the leg-
islature, and to the courts in some measure' But it is not
very good at specifying who gets what. It is quite clear
that we do not want the legislature to make absolutely all
decisions unconstrained. It is also clear that we don't
want the courts to do this either, even if they do it by
jury instead of by judge. The difficulty we have is in try-
ing to separate out whom we want to make the decisions
and why.
Kmiec: George Butler raised an important issue of federalism
that I want to address briefly. He says that we ought not
impose a rigid federal rule on all the States, so that if
California wants to be socialistic and Indiana wants to be
capitalistic, that's their business. I don't think that is the
way to frame the issue. The question is: Whether any
government, federal or state, can impose itself on an in-
dividual? This is the issue that tends to get lost over and
over again in the federalism debate.
Bond: I've been intrigued by the discussion about how one
attributes meaning to words, particularly words that are
found in the Constitution. I confess I have a fairly sim-
ple-minded approach to that problem: I assume that
when people use words, they intend them to communi-
cate some particular meaning. And in the case of those
who drafted the Constitution, it seems to me that the ini-
tial inquiry must be to look at what they intended those
words to mean. Though there are great difficulties in
that kind of historical research, they are not insurmount-
able. I think that a fair reading will reveal that the fram-
ers had a natural law concept of liberty. There is no
doubt in my mind, for example, that the people who
framed the Fourteenth Amendment and those who were
debating it at the state level understood that Section One
embodied natural law concepts. Those who defended
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment invariably
identified the source of the concepts as the Declaration
of Independence. And the Declaration of Independence,
in my view, is indisputably a natural law document. So, if
we're trying to determine what liberty means in the Con-
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stitution, we ought to be asking ourselves vhat the fram-
ers intended it to mean.
Wallin: When I read the first portion of Tim Terrell's paper,
I found it not only interesting but very satisfying in one
respect. It reminded me a little of reading a Platonic dia-
logue about the real stuff, liberty - great off-the-shelf,
without any amalgamation. Yet, the more I read, the
more I realized that I was going to soon reach a point of
profound disquietude, which I did. And that has to do
with the fact that the paper really is too divided in the
sense of having this very abstract articulation of liberty
and then talking about the historical development of the
court and juries, and so on. But in intellectual discourse,
that's not the way things ought to be. One should start
first with particular questions and examine them and
then on to the universal questions and try to articulate
them. The difficulty I found with the paper was that I
could not find a way to understand clearly what particu-
lar examples of liberty might have been in the minds of
those who wrote the Constitution.
The first thing to do, it seems to me, is to find out
what was intended in the Constitution. One has to begin
with what was intended in order to understand what one
is dealing with. A concrete example, a way to approach
this question of liberty, might be to ask a question like
this: The Constitution has something called separation of
powers; what does that mean? And one can begin with
something like The Federalist Papers, the notes on the de-
bates at the Constitutional Convention, and so on. You
may discover that it meant "a," "b," or "c." And then
you might ask, now that I understand what separation of
powers is, why do we need it? And -there's an answer to
that. It goes as far back as the Declaration of Indepen-
dence. Yet, I don't know of any way of getting to this
level of understanding - of the particular and the uni-
versal - if you begin with the abstract universal; I don't
find a way of jumping to it.
Karlin: There was, I believe, little ambiguity as to what was
intended by the word "liberty" when the Framers put to-
gether the Constitution. The word "liberty," appears in
the Preamble; and under 18th Century rules of construc-
tion, the Preamble was an extraordinarily important part
of the document. It defined what the Framers intended.




For the Framers, there was a clear identification of
property and freedom. If you could own property, it
meant you were free. Creditors were protected; there
was no intention to provide doctrinal support for the
redistributed of property rights. How do we know this?
We know it from four clauses in the Constitution and the
Bill of Rights: the Ex Post Facto clause, the Eminent Do-
main clause, the Contracts clause and the Due Process
clause, the last re-affirmed in the 14th Amendment. Life,
liberty and property are all-inclusive; and any law or reg-
ulation is to some extent an intrusion on one or another
of them, which meant, as Aaron Director put it, that
every law or regulation comes into being under a pre-
sumption of error. The four clauses were structured to
stand as barriers to intrusions on rights owned by the
people.
Liberty could then be defined as freedom from re-
straint. More practically, it guaranteed access to the mar-
ket and protected minorities from majority factions.
What it all came down to, so far as the Framers were
concerned, was that a law or regulation would be vali-
dated only if the state could show necessity. And here, it
should be parenthetically noted, the dubious distinction
between property and individual rights was hardly
stressed. As a result, neither the Court nor the legisla-
ture was supreme. Sovereignty, as the Court noted in
Yick Wo, remained with the people and people were en-
couraged to engage in voluntary exchange. The courts
were there to resolve disputes-to provide corrective
rather than distributive justice. You will recall that there
were relatively few judges, and legislators were not sup-
posed to work full time. Given those four clauses, there
really wasn't much for them to do.
Now, what happened, I suppose, is that as we kept
shifting away from a property rights orientation (liberty)
to a transfer society, it became necessary to weaken the
barriers that held the legislature in check. The impor-
tant way this was done. was to create the distinction be-
tween individual and property rights and then give to the
legislature virtually full control over property rights. It is
this distinction that has produced most of the problems
with which we are currently faced.
As a solution to these problems, the introduction of
economics as a reasoning tool has been enormously im-
portant because it showed that most laws and regula-
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tions, enacted ostensibly to help those in need, usually
miscarried and were, for the most part, counter-produc-
tive. Redistribution in the name of fairness and good
purposes was mainly a myth. This meant, then, that
there was a congruence between what the Framers in-
tended and the notion of efficiency. And only in rela-
tively few cases were efficiency and fairness unrelated.
The doctrine which describes this form of constitu-
tional law decisionmaking is "substantive due process." It
was simply a process which required of any legislative en-
actment proof of necessity. If the legislature couldn't
make the showing, the enactment was declared invalid.
What you really had were forced market solutions to
problems. And it seems to me that what was finally cre-
ated was a political structure that closely resembles what
Peter Aranson calls "radical decentralization."
Turning briefly to the jury, the difficulty with en-
larging its sphere of influence is that it gives to the jury
the right to deal with other people's property, which is
precisely what the Framers never intended. Giving this
right to the jury will probably result, in George Butler's
terms, in taking the law as given. But, what good is that?
That is the problem.
In constitutional law, as Edward Levi has explained,
it is always possible "to find again" what the Framers
"really intended" and, in the process, overturn cases.
The four clauses I earlier referred to, were intended to
be pilars of strength. I would suggest we move quickly
toward their restoration.
Williams: I'd like to start with "liberty" as used in the Fifth
Amendment. It seems to me that on this issue Lino
Graglia is unquestionably right and Norman Karlin
wrong. The two main sources that you can look at are
Magna Charta and then the succession of English stat-
utes, which every 50 or 100 years slightly modified the
Magna Charta language, and which essentially are aimed
at protecting people from having their heads chopped
off, being thrown into jail, and having their goods confis-
cated by means other than the law of the land. You can
trace these provisions down, and they flow quite
smoothly right into the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. At the same time, you can look at the state
constitutions of the 1780's and early 1790's, and see ex-
actly the same congeries of words at work, clearly aimed
at assuring that people in criminal trials are only exposed
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to punishment for having violated the positive law of the
land. I might say that some of the state constitutions also
include natural rights clauses. But a natural rights clause
was among the clauses considered at the time of the Bill
of Rights and was rejected. So it seems that a very nar-
row meaning of the word "liberty" was intended. I
might add that the history of all this was reviewed in an
article in the Harvard Law Review, appearing about 1895.
In any event, if you look at the general opinions of
the framers, the liberties which they sought to protect,
and to which they refer in the Preamble, were negative
liberties. They sought to protect liberty not, I think, by
means of the Due Process Clause, but by means of alloca-
tions of certain powers between federal and state govern-
ments - and as for the federal government, between
different branches. Liberty as choice - and particularly
with the egalitarian wrinkle added - seems to destroy
the meaning of liberty as a distinctive concept. Let me
take a concrete example: A person is out on the Blue
Ridge Mountains in 1791. He hasn't got a gun with
which to shoot game. He's a hundred miles from any civ-
ilization, and he's not good at picking berries. He is
probably going to die very soon. His life plan is zilch. Is
there any problem about his liberty? I don't think you
could have gotten a single framer to say that he had any
problem about liberty. His liberty was absolutely fine; he
was just going to die in some painful and unpleasant way.
Add to this example: Some horrible person comes along
with a backpack full of sandwiches, but won't give any to
the starving man. Has the person with the sandwiches
taken away our friend's liberty? Not at all. He's a moral
leper of the worst sort, but he hasn't interfered at all
with the guy's liberty. Yet, I understand that, in Tim
Terrell's view, the person with the sandwiches may be in
for the death penalty; in any event, he has invaded a lib-
erty interest of the poor, starving beggar. I don't think
so at all. The interest intruded upon is an interest in hu-
mane treatment, nothing more or less.
Buchanan: I sat in total astonishment as I read Tim Terrell's
paper that it could claim to be a philosophical analysis of
liberty. It literally ignores a whole tradition of legal and
political philosophy. Tim read the wrong philosophers.
This linguistic philosophy is way out there and should
have been discarded, in my view. There's a whole tradi-
tion, that goes all the way back, to which liberty has been
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central in the legal and philosophical discussion. But
there's absolutely no mention of that tradition.
I think that the-law-is-the-law is the proper approach
and the only approach that can be taken. I think that this
gives you a criterion for saying when the court or the
judiciary goes wrong. It goes wrong when it goes beyond
interpretation of what is the law. Lino Graglia seems to
say that the law is whatever the majority in the legisla-
ture decides. I certainly would get off that. I think the
legislature, like everything else, has to be bound by some
sort of a constitutional structure. The structure is rules,
and the way we make rules should be categorically dis-
tinct from the way we operate within the rules, including
the way we operate in the legislature. Now, if you stay
within the limits of what the judiciary should do, it seems
to me that George Butler's question is really just a tech-
nical question. Under some conditions, it might be better
to have a jury; other conditions might call for a judge.
But that's not legislation. It's totally different.
Butler: I don't think it's just a technical question. Some have
asserted that property has significant natural law conno-
tations and that we need to preserve the "old property,"
to coin a phrase. Well, what is the old property? There is
a principle of natural law, expounded by all the influen-
tial natural law theorists of the eighteenth century, called
the rule of necessity. It provides that, if I'm on a
mountaintop starving to death through no fault of my
own and someone happens along with an extra sandwich,
I have a right to appropriate that property. If I'm caught
in a storm, as all tort lawyers know, and I am threatened
with bodily harm, I have a right to appropriate some-
one's dock. It is a fundamental rule of property. And
what happens after I appropriate the property? I have a
natural law obligation, an implied-in-law or quasi-con-
tractual obligation, to compensate for the value of that
which I took. What value? Not the monopoly value that
one might have charged me for the sandwich. I can pay
only what the sandwich was worth to him under the cir-
cumstances. Historically, a jury would determine what he
could reasonably demand for property. So, all of you
who suggest that property is somehow a hard and fast
concept, I suggest to you that under the natural law
property is fundamentally soft at the core. It embodies
equitable doctrines, like the rule of necessity, that give
other people the right to appropriate one's property for
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what is a fair price under the circumstances, provided
the necessity is sufficiently great. You charge a jury or
some other arbiter on all points of the rule and then ask:
Under the circumstances, was the property unfairly ap-
propriated? And if not, how much does the appropriator
owe the owner.
Bond: I just want to respond to Norm Karlin's point about
Substantive Due Process. I still adhere to the view that
it's a nutty concept. "Liberty" doesn't protect any sub-
stantive rights in the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments.
If you look at the Fourteenth Amendment, which was
the campaign issue in 1866, and at all the state and con-
gressional elections of that year, no one on either side of
the question for or against ratification ever talks about
the Due Process Clause. They talk about privileges and
immunities, which was clearly intended to cover a broad
range of substantive rights, although no one ever sug-
gests that the Bill of Rights was coextensive with privi-
leges and immunities. And they talk some about equal
protection. There is no evidence in the records I've ex-
amined that the people asking if we should adopt the
Fourteenth Amendment believed that liberty protected
any substantive rights. If you recall the campaign itself,
the Democrats were opposed to ratification because they
thought that the Fourteenth Amendment conferred sub-
stantive rights on blacks under the Privileges and Immu-
nities Clause. They never suggested that the Due Process
Clause conferred any substantive rights on blacks. And if
they had even suspected that as a possibility, you can be
sure that they would have wrung their hands in horror at
the prospect of blacks having all of these rights. No one
on either side of the issue thought that "liberty," as used
in the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment, em-
braced any substantive rights.
Ellis: I am not unsympathetic with the use of linguistic analy-
sis, especially when it arises out of the English empiricist
mode; and therefore, I approached Tim Terrell's efforts
with a great deal of interest and sympathy. However, I
think that his effort at definition dooms him to defeat.
The definition attempts to include within itself a limita-
tion, the no-harm principle, in an effort to distinguish
from license. By doing so it converts itself into a kind of
utilitarian notion. But if we think in terms of liberty or
freedom as being the absence of constraint on choice and
leave for separate determination how much liberty an in-
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dividual within the society will be entitled to, then, it
seems to me, that we have at least the beginnings of a
workable definition. As soon as we start into the process
of trying to indicate limits within the definition, the defi-
nition then falls of its own weight. And I think this is one
of the problems that we have in looking at what the
framers were talking about when they talked about lib-
erty. In the original Constitution, the one that was
adopted by the framers and was ratified in 1789, before
we got the amendments, "liberty" appears only once, in
the Preamble. It is true that eighteenth century canons
of construction would require that the document be con-
strued consistently with the purposes outlined in the Pre-
amble. We in constitutional adjudication, of course, have
ignored the Preamble. But what does the Preamble say
about liberty? It says that the purpose of the document is
to secure the blessings of liberty. What is that likely to
have meant to the framers? It is those blessings of liberty,
which, as Ron Cass indicated, oppress others. And it
seems to me that, once you begin to plumb beyond that,
all you come up with is a series of rather specific provi-
sions within the original Constitution having to do with
ex post facto laws, the definition of treason, and so forth.
I think it possible - and maybe this is Lino Grag-
lia's point - that the vast bulk of the debate about con-
stitutional theory is just worthless, and that what we
ought to do is to decide what kind of goals we really are
interested in protecting. If, indeed, the framers were not
interested two hundred or so years ago in the kind of
liberty that I'm interested in protecting, then I want to
find out what I can do to get the blessings of that kind of
liberty today. If it means that the Supreme Court is go-
ing to run a little wild and sometimes come up with a
legally and technically indefensible suggestion like Sub-
stantive Due Process, so be it. There isn't any easy solu-
tion to these issues that is going to grow out of the words
that exist. I suspect that what we know about economics,
economic theory, and economic philosophy today will
lead us to a more salutary result than what the Founding
Fathers knew or thought about liberty in 1787.
III. ENFORCING THE CONSTITUTION: OF INSTITUTIONS AND
HUMAN PREROGATIVE
Komesar: In institutional terms, I think it's accurate to say
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that the Due Process Clause borrowed language from an
institutional historic setting, wherein the major problem
was fear of the executive and the remedy was the legisla-
ture. Is it equally appropriate to say that all that was
meant by due process protection was that one only has a
right to what the legislature gives him - not to what the
king gives, but what the legislature gives? By the time I
get to the Fourteenth Amendment, I have great doubt
that the framers were saying that state legislatures would
be the determiners of what process meant. I'm now not
talking about Substantive Due Process, but about proce-
dure. Surely, there was a tremendous distrust of state
legislatures which underlay the drafting by the 39th Con-
gress of the Fourteenth Amendment. So, I have a diffi-
cult time believing that the Due Process Clause and its
institutional underpinnings have quite the clear intent
that has been indicated here. I guess I'm saying that I
don't believe those who tell me that the history is that
clear.
Graglia: As for the Constitution and what the framers and
ratifiers intended, it is clear that the limitations in the
original Constitution and the Bill of Rights were meant
to limit only the federal government. When there are
meant to be restrictions on the states, that is explicitly
stated the restrictions are extremely few, and I can't em-
phasize too much how few and unimportant they are. I
mean, a thing like the prohibition of granting "titles of
nobility" is repeated twice; once for the federal govern-
ment and once for the states. Also, the idea that the ra-
tifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment meant to limit
themselves is not a very plausible one. If anything is clear
about the whole history of the Fourteenth Amendment,
it is that it was a time of extreme chaos, a time of high
moral fervor. It takes high moral fervor to abolish slav-
ery and bring on and win a Civil War. And you're not
going to get the most balanced judgments with that kind
of fervor.
John Marshall established judicial review. For good-
ness sake, it's not at all clear the framers and ratifiers
meant there to be judicial review. Is it not astounding
that judicial review was not mentioned in the Constitu-
tion? If it was intended, I would certainly expect to see a
very clear statement, and it's not there. Then, when
Marshall read it in, all he said was, if the Constitution
says that the crime of treason requires two witnesses and
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the statute says one witness, then we don't enforce the
statute. He was talking about very specific restrictions. A
real constitutional problem arose when Senator William
Saxbe wanted to be Attorney General, and President
Nixon wanted him to be Attorney General, and unlike
the present situation with Ed Meese, nobody was op-
posed to his being Attorney General. Everybody agreed
that would be just fine, but it turned out to be uncionsti-
tutionall Can you imagine? Much finagling was necessary
because the Constitution provides that one cannot hold
an office if he voted to raise the salary of the office while
he was in the Congress. I thought this was fascinating:
the Constitution really was relevant to something, and all
it did was create an unnecessary problem.
Wallin: There are two questions before us. One, what did the
framers understand by the Constitution, and what do we
understand? Secondly, should we abide by it? I am per-
suaded that the framers meant for the federal govern-
ment to do far less than it does today. They didn't expect
the price of milk in Iowa to be set in Congress.
But the question that interests me more is whether
we should abide by the original Constitution, if we can
understand what it means. And it seems to me that we
have to be careful about saying: No, because we are in-
terested in other kinds of liberty today. That ignores the
distinction between legitimacy and illegitimacy. The
Constitution not only separates powers and says what in-
stitutions will do what; it also sets up legitimate bounds
of obligation in this country. We live in a country based
upon consent. And so long as the Constitution holds as
the fundamental law of the land, there is a legitimacy to
regular law, positive law. That doesn't mean we can't
change it. We can change it, and there is a mechanism
for changing it. But simply to ignore it because it doesn't
seem to meet our needs now is to open up the very thing
that the framers and the people who ratified it wanted to
tighten down. They were frightened of whimsical,
changing, tyrannical majorities, of which any of us could
be a part at any time. We just decide that we want some-
thing; and wham, we go after it and be judges in our own
case. The Constitution is intended to retard that perni-
cious desire of democratic peoples. And that's one reason
why it was intended to be a much less direct form of de-
mocracy than, in fact, it is.
Manne: Let me be ultra-cynical. I think that people decide, in
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effect, whether to grant more emphasis to intent and his-
torical circumstance or to what is passing at the moment
simply by virtue of which of those approaches serves
their interests best. We may argue as though, in good
faith, we are examining what the founders' intent really
was in order to enforce it; but the only people who seem
to want that are those who want the results such an ap-
proach gives. Now, as for so-called judicial conservatives
who feel bound by precedent, I wouldn't want one of
them on the Court because they wouldn't cure anything.
They would feel bound by what has been going on for
the last fifty years and presumably would follow it.
Bond: I would never assert that history is always clear, but the
fact that it may be unclear on certain points doesn't
mean that it's unclear on every point. With respect to the
question of due process, I think there is a reasonable de-
gree of clarity.
The question was raised of whether a change in in-
stitutions or a change in attitude translates that language
used at one period into something other than what it
originally meant. I think the internal structure of the Bill
of Rights is against the suggestion that the Due Process
Clause was intended to protect certain substantive rights
from legislative infringement. The Fourteenth Amend-
ment was intended to prohibit the states from doing cer-
tain things substantively and certain things procedurally.
It was intended to nationalize the protection of civil lib-
erties, at least in Section One. As for the question, what
difference does it make, I think it makes an enormous
difference if you believe in the rule of law. If you are
talking about living under a rule of law and not under a
rule of judges, you have to adhere to the original under-
standing insofar as you can ascertain it and insofar as you
can apply it sensibly and reasonably to current problems
before you.
Butler: In terms of the Seventh Amendment, I think the Due
Process Clause was really an afterthought. The people
wanted to see the right to a jury trial clearly stated. It is
the jury as an institution that, through its power to judge
mixed questions of law and fact, implements assumed no-
tions of what liberty is. The jury will not allow the gov-
ernment, in the popular parlance, to screw its fellow citi-
zens. The jury will not let the government get by with
oppression. The jury has the right to decide that a stat-
ute is invalid because of its ex post facto effect, that is to
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say, because the statute nullifies a legitimate pre-existing
expectation, whether we call it a privilege or an entitle-
ment or a property right-or, compendiously, one of our
intangible liberties.
Komesar: Let me clear up two points. First, when I spoke
about the Due Process Clause in the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments, I was not speaking of substantive
process. I was speaking about Procedural Due Process.
Second, I think it does not follow that constraints upon
the legislature necessarily mean judicial review. Enforce-
ment of constitutional provisions can come through the
political process, by people who believe that, as part of
their political and voting power, the Constitution ought
be obeyed.
My concern, with narrow historical interpretations
has come to be associated with Raoul Burger's interpre-
tation of the Fourteenth Amendment. He has argued
that the framers and ratifiers never intended that voting
rights or school desegregation or public facility desegre-
gation would be covered. Let's assume for the moment
that that's clear and that we have an interpretist judge
sitting, who is aware that the intent of the framers and
ratifiers was to protect the basic civil rights of blacks,
which meant the ability to sell one's labor, make con-
tracts, etc. Let's also assume for the moment that the
States, aided by slippery and tricky lawyers, are able to
continuously and subtly impose restrictions, and that the
federal courts recognize that, for a number of reasons,
they are unable to overturn those decisions. Suppose
they recognize that the only way, in fact, to deliver those
rights is by providing better education and better access
to the political process. What will this mean to an inter-
pretist judge? Is a law unconstitutional because it violates
the intent of the Congress and the ratifiers as to voting
and schools, or is it constitutional because it achieves the
end that they sought? It seems to me that there are, in
the process of interpretation a whole range of possible
conflicts between objectives and constraints.
Cass: Neil Komesar raises the difficulty of interpreting the
Constitution by reference to history. But if one's agenda
is maximizing efficiency, it may very well be that a writ-
ten document, which spells out as clearly as we can rules
for decision-making and which offers some content for
those rules, is the most efficient way to proceed, particu-
larly when we disagree on what we ought to be doing.
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Granted that the historical record is not absolutely crys-
tal clear and granted as well that we want today different
things; but that is very different than saying that it is
wrong or inefficient to have rules to begin with.
Aranson: There is a fundamental error in referring to the leg-
islative intent of the Congress, intent of the courts, in-
tent of the framers, or intent of the ratifiers. Intent is a
quality of individual human beings and not of institu-
tions. It is an organic fallacy to impute intent to institu-
tions. This is not just a totally disconnected, methodolog-
ical point. Subcategories under this general species of
error concern such concepts as consent and legitimacy.
Liberty may require consent, but I doubt if more than
ten or twenty percent of us here in any meaningful sense
of the word, really consent to the Internal Revenue Tax
Code. Liberty may require consent, and consent may rest
on legitimacy. Yet, the question remains concerning to
what and whether we are consenting. If we look at the
process by which the Constitution was framed, William
Riker, has forcefully demonstrated that large parts of the
Constitutional Convention, where votes were taken, re-
flect cyclical majorities; that is, situations in which Mo-
tion A defeated B, B defeated C, and C defeated A. And
so, agenda manipulation, some sophisticated voting,
some bundling, and certain parliamentary artifices were
going on. Hence to speak in any meaningfu.l sense about
the intent of the framers is nonsense. There was no real
mechanism for revealing intent. And indeed, there is no
way of counting up to find the majority motion that
would defeat any other motion.
We might claim that written rules are necessary; we
claim that consent requires a certain kind of legitimacy
in the process, and legitimacy requires that we go by in-
tent. We can even draw the arrows differently, that con-
sent requires a certain attention to legislative or constitu-
tional intent. And yet, these very concepts, which reflect
back to an older public interest standard have absolutely
no meaning in this discussion. One is led back to Henry
Manne's view (and Chief Justice Hughes's view as well)
that the Constitution is what the judges say it is. There
exists no fixed anchor of preferences revealed by organic
bodies.
Gellhorn: Returning briefly to Tim Terrell's discussion of
whether words have meanings outside of the results for
seeking them, it is interesting, for example, how the Fed-
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eral Trade Commission and the federal courts have ap-
plied the meaning of "false and deceptive advertise-
ment." Rather than looking at the understanding of the
audience to whom the advertising is directed, they look
primarily to the dictionary as to what were the possible
meanings. From this come some strange results. One
case found that any claim that hair coloring is "perma-
nent" means that, in terms of the dictionary, it promises
that the hair thereafter will always be the new color. It is
therefore deceptive, of course, because it doesn't color
the hair that hasn't grown out yet. That ruling can be
upheld, even though all the evidence in the hearing
might point the other way. The basic law here was made
in the Charles of the Ritz case, in connection with womens'
facial cream, the advertising of which was found imper-
missible because it was labeled "rejuvenescence." It was
relabeled, and is currently sold under the title of
"revenascence." That is okay, because if you look up the
dictionary definition of "revenascence," it's not a word
but was derived from "revenant," which means to have a
ghost-like quality. The fact that the public doesn't inter-
pret it that way is unimportant. All I mean to suggest is
that it seems to be somewhat doubtful to take a look at
the meaning of words separate from context, because
various understandings, of course, can only be developed
in context of reliance upon other areas of law. Dictionary
definitions, it seems to me, have been most unfortunate.
I also would suggest that the interpretation of the
term "liberty" is quite different now, because the sub-
stantive law is quite different. For example, we have
changed the understanding of the term "liberty" in con-
nection with public employees, because we've changed
the meaning of the First Amendment by adding First
Amendment limitations on the removal of public em-
ployees. That is, after elections, we cannot throw out
low-level employees for political reasons. We can only
throw out confidential employees in policy-making
positions.
Ellis: I guess I'm very skeptical of George Butler's view that
the framers' intent was that the jury would decide the
law as well as the facts. That skepticism begins from the
text of the Seventh Amendment itself, which notably
does not say that the jury shall be the judge of the law
and the facts, although there was precedent for that kind
of specification. I think this is consistent with the kind of
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political bargaining that was going on. In the colonial,
revolutionary, and early constitutional periods, there was
a persistent tension between centralization and decentral-
ization of power. Should the colonies have the ability to
make decisions? Should those decisions be made by the
Board of Trade? Should they be made by Parliament?
Should they be made by the Proprietor? A lot of that
tension was reflected, first in the Articles and then in the
Constitution, with a shift in the balance of power from
those who saw advantages in being decentralized to those
who saw advantages in having centralized power. The
jury's role is very significant because the jury embodies
decentralized decision-making, as opposed to the judge
who is likely to reflect more centralized concerns. In the
Amendments, we see a shift back toward more decision-
making at the decentralized level. Throughout this pe-
riod, two of the groups in opposition were creditors and
debtors. The creditors and those people engaged in pro-
viding capital, and that includes owning land, tended to
argue for centralized power. The debtors tended to ar-
gue for decentralized power. So I see the role of the
jury, not as an embodiment of high principles of liberty
and of moral common sense, but as the outcome of a ten-
sion between people who saw their self-interest as having
centralized or decentralized loci of power. You end up,
of course, with a compromise. But I don't think the com-
promise - the Constitution - puts nearly as much
power in the hands of the civil jury as George has
suggested.
Wheeler: I am struck each time I pick up Elliot's Debates or the
Annals of the Congress, which admittedly are not my nor-
mal bedtime fare, by the paucity of references in those
documents to the word "liberty." Nonetheless, I think
certainly the concept transcends the number of times it is
mentioned in those documents or in the Constitution.
For example, just because we find the term "brandy tax"
indexed by Elliot and the term "liberty" not indexed, we
cannot assume that the Founding Fathers were more
concerned with drink than with liberty. We do find hot-
heads like Patrick Henry talking about liberty. But we
also find others, such as the more reflective James
Madison, who, though not to my knowledge in the Feder-
alist Papers, certainly in his correspondence about "lib-
erty" and the Declaration of Rights. It may be true, as
one Convention correspondent claimed, that the Amend-
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ments were taken up only in the last three days of the
Constitutional Convention. But nevertheless, Madison
saw them as of paramount importance. He did not call
them Amendments but rather the Declaration of Rights;
and he comes on very hard to the effect that the Consti-
tution simply wasn't going to get through - the States,
he claimed, would not ratify it - without attachment of
the Declaration of Rights.
As to "liberty" today, I for one am not overwrought
by the complexity of the term. It seems fairly easy to talk
about "liberty" and systems of liberties. Certainly, I
think there is some rough consensus as to what free
speech means, what freedom of association and freedom
of religion mean. The more interesting question,
though, and where I would hope to redirect some of our
discussion, relates to promoting guarantees of liberty.
How do you ensure it? Or can you? Now, George Butler
says that the panacea is the jury system, or at least that it
is extremely prominent among guarantees; but I would
like to hear also from Tim Terrell on what he sees as the
central ways to guarantee liberty.
Terrell: Very briefly and quickly, perhaps the only truly effec-
tive way of guaranteeing liberties, particularly liberties
that are in the Constitution, is to return to the way in
which the document was structured in the first place.
That is, although there was a granting of power to the
central government, it was a very carefully limited one.
Certain powers were bestowed on the federal govern-
ment, with the clear negative implication that other pow-
ers were not so granted. So, one could take the First
Amendment-"Congress shall make no law abridging
the freedom of speech"-to mean exactly that: The fed-
eral Congress could make no law with regard to speech.
That matter was left for the States. Thus, one way to
guarantee liberties is to deny power in the first place.
Manne: How are you going to bell that cat? How are you go-
ing to get there? You have basically an agency-cost prob-
lem. People in government are going to do things in
their own self-interest. What can we do to guarantee that
people will behave consistently with protections of liberty
of the sorts we have been talking about?
Morgan: Before Edd Wheeler spoke, I thought I was alone in
my position and was reluctant to interject, because the
discussions have been very interesting; but I think we
make a mistake when we focus exclusively on the ques-
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tion of the meaning of the term "liberty" as it is used in
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitu-
tion. It seems to me that there is a difference between
the notion of liberty as a value which underlies our un-
derstanding of a great many issues in Constitutional law,
and the question of exactly how we would interpret that
given term in a given situation. I think that inherent in
the concept of a good and just society is the concept of
liberty. If you do believe that values are important, then
it becomes essential, not just useful, to have some sense
of what liberty might mean in a broader context than
simply the way it was used or the way it was understood
by a particular majority of the Founders at particular
moments in the Constitutional Convention.
When I come back to Tim Terrell's paper, I find it
to be a very useful effort, not so much to describe the
thought processes of the drafters of the Constitution - I
am certain that it doesn't describe that - but to try to
put some kind of sense in the term "liberty," something
that can be used at least as a point of departure. The
process of trying to understand what liberty means as a
word on the one hand, and as a concept on the other, is
one that is worth undertaking-partly from the histori-
cal interests, but, inevitably, as several people have sug-
gested, to think about current issues as well. I grant all of
the difficulties of having Justice Blackmun or whomever
deciding today what the Constitution means in his own
terms rather than in the terms of the founders. And, in-
evitably, there is a fundamental tension: How much in-
terpretive power you want to give to the Court; how
much you want to give to the legislature? But these last, I
would suggest, are separate questions from the more
general issue of what liberty means as a value.
Kmiec: Despite Peter Aranson's insistence that attributing in-
tent to the founders is nonsense, I nevertheless think it is
extremely important to look at the original intent of indi-
vidual framers for an understanding of an historical per-
spective of the Constitution and to discover the ethical
values that undergird the document itself. Peter's pre-
mise was: Since groups do not have intent and individu-
als do, the Constitution, therefore, is nothing more than
what the judges say it is. That is clearly judicial activism
at its worst. Assuming a lack of collective intent should
lead us back to an examination of what individual fram-
ers actually did in light of then-existing external con-
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straints. These constraints focus upon the individual in
the sense of natural law, natural rights, or property
rights. It all ties back to individual human action. And in
those individual, rather than collective, terms, the con-
cepts of consent and intent, constitutional or otherwise,
are very useful, because they define clearly, I think, what
the framers as individuals did or did not consent to in
any meaningful sense of a social contract.
Gellhorn: I want to respond to the point in Tim Terrell's pa-
per that the concept of liberty is an expansive notion,
and that as government grows in power and pervasive-
ness, then liberty must also expand to meet the chal-
lenge. It is very attractive, and I liked the statement until
I started to go back historically and think - in terms of
Administrative Law and Constitutional Law - how the
concept of liberty was expanded by the Supreme Court
in the 1960's. Prior to then, we had a concept of a right-
privilege distinction; that is, to go back to a Holmesian
aphorism in the 1890's, that we all may have a right to
free speech, but we don't have a right to be a policeman.
Therefore, a policeman does not have all rights of free
speech. That concept was eroded in the 1960's by the
idea that there is a liberty interest in public employees
that undercuts the concept of the right-privilege distinc-
tion. That is, as government undertakes a greater role in
terms of employment, we have to provide constitutional
protections, because if one is, say, a nuclear physicist
working on defense-related matters, there is no employer
other than the government. That kind of analysis got the
Court into trouble, and they ultimately withdrew from
this position. But the issue that they never addressed is:
If the monopoly position is the underlying concern, why
does not the same Procedural Due Process, as inter-
preted in this fashion, apply also to General Motors or to
other private employers who get a lock on a major posi-
tion in the market? If you start to develop a liberty con-
cept as an expansive notion, it is not necessarily a one-
way instrument. There is no reason that it might not be
turned around. And, to follow up on one of Lino Grag-
lia's points, if you are having the judges apply the con-
cept, then you have no systemic constraints.
Harriss: A couple of comments. One of the points of Consti-
tutional Law is to provide as secure a framework as is
reasonably possible for us to carry on our activities. One
of the big issues before Congress now is bankruptcy law,
[Vol. I
SEMINAR TRANSCRIPT
which is an area of uncertainty that has not been taken
care of. Another big issue has been the failure of modern
governments to preserve the value of the currency. Con-
stitutional Law, it seems, has failed us in this country and
elsewhere in this aspect of governmental life. And there
is another whole range of issues which hasn't been
brought up here, and that is the role of the civil service.
The bureaucracy, in its discretion, both limits and en-
hances our liberty from case to case. But I suppose the
majority of these cases never get to court for a decision.
Finally, we see that most of the world is not living under
constitutions, or at least ones which really serve liberty
very well.
IV. THE ALTAR OF EQUAL LIBERTY AND THE SHRINE OF
EFFICIENCY
Buchanan: We've been discussing liberty, but not once have I
heard the word "equal" put before liberty. And to me
that is amazing. Some have called it the first principle of
justice, and I think we would get a lot further if we think
in terms of equal liberty. The real issue is: To what ex-
tent can Substantive Due Process or protection for eco-
nomic property rights be a viable normative principle?
We seem to have departed grossly from the concept of
equal liberty with things like progressive taxation.
Butler: I suggest that the problem with Substantive Due Pro-
cess is that it's not viable; it's too blunt an instrument. A
more discrete instrument is needed. Let a jury compen-
sate on an individual basis, if a plaintiff can prove to the
satisfaction of the jury, not that the law on its face is
somehow violative of natural law principles in the ab-
stract, but that in the particular case plaintiff's expecta-
tions were legitimate and founded upon sufficient detri-
mental reliance, and hence that it would be unfair to
deny him equal liberty by failing to compensate.
Aranson: To say that substantive due process is too blunt an
instrument is to fail to put on the backs of the Congress
the job of writing legislation that is not going to be over-
turned or that is not going to be too expensive. If you
say to Congress, anytime you err there may be a little
compensation paid, then its members' incentives to write
good legislation that is going to stand up is less than if
you say, if you err we shall overturn the whole statute.
Butler: There is a libertarian ideal of isonomia, or having
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equal law of generalized impact (Professor Hayek, for
one, is particularly enamored of this idea); and if you
subscribe to this ideal, you don't want Congress writing
particularized statutes. Because once we concede that iso-
nomia is no longer an attainable ideal, we open the door
for Congress to single out only unpopular people for
statutory deprivations. Because of this ideal, we want to
encourage Congress to pass laws of a high level of gener-
ality, which inevitably means that the law, while just in
most cases, will have an unfair impact on some. That
problem of over-inclusiveness creates the need to have
someone, I say the jury, dispense discrete equity through
compensation.
Liebeler: I want to go back to a state of nature, if you will, and
ask what arrangements we might expect to come out of
that kind of environment. In this state of nature, pre-
sumably we're all expending resources defending our-
selves from predators who are trying to take away from
us that which we have wrenched from the earth. In this
situation, everyone could gain from establishing govern-
ment. The question is, what terms are likely to arise out
of the contract that would arise from this situation?
There would be those who have more power, I suppose,
than others, and who would have taken into their posses-
sion something that we might call property or material
possessions. These persons would not be likely to agree
to a regime in which their goods might readily be taken
away by predators. The purpose of establishing a consti-
tutional regime is to reduce the transactions costs of pro-
tecting your holdings against others; that's why we estab-
lish a rule of law. The parties to this contract that arises
from the state of nature might agree that the contract
could only be changed by unanimous consent. Unani-
mous consent, however is often difficult to obtain, so you
need some alternative arrangement that permits the gov-
ernment to make collective decisions in a way that has
lower costs than unanimous consent. It seems to me that
due process, or something like Substantive Due Process,
can be seen as a substitute for the requirement of unani-
mous consent for change, or the taking of property,
which is what I mean by change. Due process is one way
of doing this, because it acts as a limit on government,
whether the government is the king or the legislature or
the courts.
But the question is: Even if we build into our charter
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the requirement of due process, how do we know when
process has been due? Thinking about that as an econo-
mist, I would say that due process cannot occur unless
the act of the government that we're examining has
some chance of increasing the total welfare of the com-
munity. That looks very much like an efficiency crite-
rion, and as a first cut, that's what it is. If the proposed
act of the government appears to have some chance of
increasing the gains which the members of the commu-
nity can obtain from private transactions, then it is a
valid governmental act. It need not actually succeed; but
it at least must have a chance of enhancing the total wel-
fare of the community by increasing the available gains
from private transactions for the individual members of
the community. Obviously, that would include all gov-
ernmental regulations or laws that reduce the cost of
conducting private transactions. To list briefly the kinds
of transactions in which this government could engage: it
can set up a monetary system; it can enforce contracts; it
can establish weights and measures. Other transactions
are out if they do not meet the due process standard; for
example, an act of the legislature that interferes with
trade or has the effect of reducing gains from trade.
Anything that the government does that interferes with
or potentially reduces the gains of private transactions
does not meet the test of due process under this stan-
dard. This model, however, leaves us with a category of
transactions that I don't know how to handle. I would
characterize these as welfare-state-type programs. By
this, I do not mean a proposal that pays milk farmers for
not producing milk, or grape farmers for not producing
grapes, but rather a program that transfers, either di-
rectly or in kind, money to the "poor." I don't know
what to do about those transactions using my basic
model, because they in themselves don't appear to in-
crease gains from trade in the community. I don't know
what their efficiency is. But it wouldn't bother me if the
regime I'm describing had the power under this due pro-
cess provision to make transfers like this, as long as there
was some kind of limitation on it. What I want to do is
distinguish the milk producers, the tobacco farmers, the
wheat farmers, and the people who benefit from tariffs
and other restrictions on free trade form those who are
"truly needy," if you will. I am not, however, able to find
a principled way to do that.
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I've described what I would insist on if I were nego-
tiating to move from a state of nature. Aside from that
academic exercise, however, it is worth noting that we
actually have due process provisions in the Constitution.
What do these provisions and their predecessors mean?
Could the king give due process in a decision that he
made by himself? I have always supposed that he could.
That suggests that due process is necessarily at least in
part substantive. If the king could give due process with-
out regard to the procedures he followed to reach a deci-
sion, presumably the legislature can too. And both the
king and the legislature can make decisions that do not
provide due process, once again without regard to the
procedures by which they reach a decision. The king can
violate the law of the land; so can the legislature.
Butler: It seems to me that Substantive Due Process, as ad-
ministered by five of nine Supreme Court justices,
doesn't cut the mustard. I think that a surrogate require-
ment, administered by a unanimous jury of twelve, has a
certain appeal, since the unanimous jury of twelve is not
afflicted by the hold-out and other phenomena that af-
flict a society-wide, Paretian unanimity requirement. If
we had the jury apply Substantive Due Process, it would
be allowed to set off, as it historically has done, benefits
against burdens in deciding what just compensation is
due. So, if the jury evaluates a regulation and decides
that the individual, because of the benefit he will derive,
should be reasonably content to suffer a majority-im-
posed restriction, then the jury can apply this reasonable
man standard. The prominent excuses for allowing a ma-
jority to impose uncompensated, intangible sacrifice on
an individual are largely based on the notion that when
we entered into a social contract, we agreed to assume
the risk of randomly imposed sacrifices for the public
good. Therefore, Justice Frankfurter argued that when
those randomly imposed sacrifices materialize, an individ-
ual should not feel that he's the victim of an inequity.
But when are uncompensated harms a reasonable sacri-
fice based on the hypothetical notion of social compact?
When is it reasonable for a person to expect that, by sub-
mitting to this type of sacrifice, he will be better off?
Some argue that it should be a legislative question, since
there are no neutral standards. I say it should be a jury
question.
Liebeler: Let me give you a case. There is an ordinance in
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Brattleboro, Vermont, that says you cannot run a taxicab
unless you get permission from the selectmen of the
town. There are two taxicab companies in town now, and
the selectmen announced, upon application by a woman,
that they were not going to allow anymore taxicabs be-
cause they would just lose money. The woman re-
sponded, beautifully, I thought, that that was her busi-
ness. The selectmen finally relented. But what if this
woman comes before a jury of her peers in Brattleboro,
Vermont, and says: I have a reasonable expectation that
I can run a taxicab in the town of Brattleboro. Where in
the hell did she get it? The statute has said for years that
she cannot do it without the permission of the selectmen.
How does she raise the question? What does she try to
tell the jury? She hasn't got a chance.
Butler: She might argue, for instance, detrimental reli-
ance-that there is a consistent history of the granting of
these applications; that she has already gone out and pur-
chased her taxi; and that it is unfair for the city to
squelch her expectations without compensation.
Liebeler: That approach is not satisfactory. It is clear that, on
an efficiency basis, there is no public good to be derived
from preventing taxicab companies from entering the
market in Brattleboro, Vermont. It is a common calling;
it is a business that anybody should be free to engage in.
Butler: Well, our tests differ, because I am not worshipping at
the shrine of efficiency. I am worshipping at the shrine
of individual liberty. If this individual woman can show,
using Professor Terrell's taxonomy, that her personal
liberty has been significantly infringed upon, that she
had a justifiable expectation, then that would provide an
informed debate before the jury.
Aranson: I cannot imagine making the economic argument
and having it stick a fair number of times with the jury.
Jim Buchanan's work over a lifetime, and certainly mine
and that of several others over the past ten years, sug-
gests that our present institutions of government are just
incapable of replicating economic results. They are en-
gines of creating private benefits at collective costs.
There are no exceptions. The second problem is more
severe. I refer to the work of Hayek and others, which
has become increasingly attractive in certain of its as-
pects. One of those aspects reinforces the notion that the
sort of thing that Jim asks the government to do looks
like central planning under another name. Now, it would
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never be called central planning, because it looks like
traditional, old-fashioned legislation. But, it is in essence
central planning when it says: This is our plan; this is
what we want to accomplish; these are the provisions of
policy; and, the legislature or courts or juries, at least at
the federal level, say we are going to try to do this. The
remedy to this is the most radical decentralization possi-
ble. The juries are advantageous, but put them at the lo-
cal level. The legislature is acceptable, but they should
be in the smallest towns possible. What I mean by the
smallest town possible is that unit which encapsulates the
externality or the benefit to be produced, and nothing
larger. Indeed, the burden of proof should be on those
who want something larger whenever they recommend
any kind of consolidation. In a sense, George Butler's ju-
ries are attractive, because they produce this kind of de-
centralization automatically.
Buchanan: I think that efficiency outcomes will emerge if you
stick with the equal-liberty notion. What are the means
by which you can limit and secure liberty as a constitu-
tional value? It seems to me that it is possible in terms of
equal liberty - by thinking of liberty simply as a range
of choice. If you require equal liberty, if you can't go
beyond equal liberty, you get essentially a meaningful
concept of individual liberty. Anybody would have a
right to have a taxicab company; you couldn't have tar-
iffs or minimum wages; anybody could contract with any-
body else. There are lots of these things from which effi-
ciency would emerge as an outcome.
Cass: It seems to me that there may be considerable differ-
ences between the equal-liberty notion that Jim
Buchanan is putting forward, the efficiency notion that
Jim Liebeler is putting forward, and the compensation-
by-juries notion that George Butler has put forward.
Even if we can identify in the abstract what we want, we
have a terrible time knowing when we have got it. I
don't see how any of the proposals put forward really
solves the problem of getting us to these different ends.
If we are trying to identify an efficiency norm for society,
how do we have the legislature or the juries or the courts
make the interpersonal comparisons that are necessary to
get to the sort of social welfare curve that I think Jim
Liebeler is proposing? If we move either to judges, as Jim
Buchanan suggests, or to juries, as George suggests, we
still don't get out of the box. Judges give much to criti-
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cize. We view them either as abdicating responsibility to
review what other branches do or as selectively interven-
ing to promote personal values. In large measure, both
criticisms flow from judges' inability to work out princi-
ples to screen good legislative decisions from the bad. As
for juries, they really scare me. Having talked with peo-
ple who have served on juries and having gone to a
courthouse to see who gets selected to sit on juries, I find
these to be much more unsatisfactory as decision-making
bodies than almost any of the others. Certainly, if we
combine the jury with a compensation scheme, whereby
the jury gets to compensate people out of government
funds, that seems to me to set up a real negative-sum
game. We tax all of us; and, then, the jury, which doesn't
have to bear more than a small fraction of the cost, gets
to say who gets that money. We don't require winners to
buy out losers. We tax everyone and then give it all to
the jury, which on ad hoc bases determines, on who
knows what grounds, which people will receive particular
shares of the general fund. We have a serious problem
here.
Bond: I think that Jim Buchanan's concept of equal liberty is
the way to solve a whole range of problems. Equal pro-
tection, unlike due process, is historically a relatively new
concept. It certainly is not in the original draft of the
Constitution. It really does not become a topic that is dis-
cussed very widely until the abolitionists are searching
for some way to construct a legal argument to support
their position. The Republicans consistently quoted
Abraham Lincoln when trying to explain what equal pro-
tection meant. Abraham Lincoln had said: I believe that
every man has the right to be the equal of every other
man, if he can. And whenever that quotation from
speeches on the stump was cited in newspapers, there
were parentheticals (great cheering, thunderous ap-
plause), indicating to me that the point was reasonably
well understood, that the equal protection concept as
embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment was inter-
preted by the people as meaning an equal chance insofar
as the law is concerned. And so you take the Brattleboro
cab example and say: Look, everybody ought to have a
chance to drive a cab. And if they don't, it is a violation
of equal liberty. You don't have to rely upon Substantive
Due Process. You don't have to turn to juries for com-
pensation. It is a simple question of equal protection.
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Williams: It seems to me that a method which successfully
protects efficiency will coincidentally protect liberty and
vice versa, but I think the idea of either judges or juries
doing this very successfully is improbable in the extreme.
The jury will deteriorate to super-micro considerations
such as whether the woman had bought her taxicab yet
and all kinds of things which are utterly irrelevant to the
efficiency argument - and, I think, equally irrelevant to
the liberty argument. I don't expect much better from
judges. Certainly, I think the idea of their being able to
make serious judgments about efficiency is likely to dete-
riorate, as George Butler's paper suggests, into essen-
tially bland acquiescence in the legislative decision. That
takes me to Peter Aranson's proposal on decentraliza-
tion. It seems to me that competitive restraints, restraints
arising out interjurisdictional competition, are likely to
be successful in a decentralized setting, because at least
to the extent that the jurisdictions involved are small,
both productive labor and productive capital can flee;
and that means essentially that productive labor and cap-
ital will flow to the jurisdictions which do not go in for
rent redistribution on a grand scale. The difficulty with
the large entity is that it suffers much less from the com-
petitive restraints and the ability of productive labor and
capital to flee, although the interesting thing is that with
the development of modern transportation and commu-
nications, there has been substantial ability of labor and
capital to flee from the United States. And that probably
has had a significant effect in constraining the tendency
of the American Congress to enact destructive legisla-
tion. It isn't self-evident just how you draw these jurisdic-
tional lines, at what point a court constrains Congress
from interfering with local matters. But I think that in
asking a court to draw that line, you can legitimately say
that the burden is on the higher level jurisdiction to
show -a need to displace the powers of the lower level ju-
risdiction, and that the line can be enforced with a good
deal less data gathering and probably a good deal less
ideological noise than any kind of direct effort to get
judges to protect efficiency or liberty.
Kmiec: I must disagree with the earlier suggestion of using
compensation as a substitute for unanimous consent. The
suggestion is a great expansion of the concept of eminent
domain. In fact, it gives to the collective a power of emi-
nent domain which the private individual did not possess.
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There was not in the state of nature, in any ethical sense,
a private power of eminent domain, except for purposes
of rectification and the prevention of invasive harms.
Since the individual didn't have "the despotic power" in
the state of nature, I don't see how the state gets it once
we collectively agree to form the republic. Thus, the no-
tion of compensation as a substitute for consent, at its
core, is fundamentally illegitimate.
Morgan: Jim Liebeler has outlined well the substantive ap-
proach to the idea of due process but I must say that I
come down on the institutional side, because I think the
"proper" substantive approach to resolving these issues
is ultimately almost impossible for the courts to decide.
I hesitate ever to come in favor of regulation, but I
think I ought to articulate for a moment the argument in
favor of regulating taxicabs. We have heard everyone
concede apparently that you can't do that-that it is the
one universally recognized instance of a restraint on
human freedom. [Laughter] But in Atlanta, at least, the
situation is that a person comes into the airport, goes to
the taxi ramp, and gets into the first cab in line. That cab
may be driven by an honest and trustworthy individual
or by a rogue and a thief, someone who might drive the
passenger to a dark part of town and murder him.
Hence, in order to stimulate confidence in coming to At-
lanta and reduce passenger search costs, the city tries to
assure that there is a reliable supply of taxicab drivers
and that the drivers who are on the streets are reliable.
My point is not to sell the validity of this argument;
it is to sell the notion that one can make a theoretical
construct, not saying the rule serves only the existing in-
dustry, for almost all kinds of regulation. The question is
not: Should we only permit regulation that is favorable
to all efficient working of the market? It is: How does a
court go about deciding, in a particular case, whether a
given approach to regulation, a given action of govern-
ment, is one that is, in fact, enhancing of liberty or not
enhancing of liberty?
And that's why I'm taken by George Butler's sugges-
tion, not because I think juries are inevitably right or in-
evitably consistent - they aren't. But the world is com-
posed of people trying to struggle with realistic
alternatives for imperfectly doing jobs. And I am struck
by the notion that juries are a relatively low level, rela-
tively reasonable group of people, who are likely, in the
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aggregate, to tend to make reasonably good decisions.
Use of the jury is also likely to create a context in which
the person deciding whether to adopt a given regulation
has to think of the fact that one day he is going to have
to take this case to a jury of reasonable people and ex-
plain it to them.
If you accept the proposition that there is going to
be some government, and that government is going to
make decisions which affect the common good and lib-
erty, then the question becomes: What mechanism is best
for trying to resolve the questions at the margin? Of
course, Henry Manne is right: Ninety-nine percent of the
cases aren't at the margin; they are sub-marginal. But
some questions are at the margin, and I think that for
resolving those, the jury may well be the best
mechanism.
Aranson: The problem with criticism of interjurisdictional
competition and decentralization is basically that it com-
pares the good with the perfect, rather than comparing
the array of possible institutions available in the real
world.. Every institution has its characteristic costs and
benefits, which may be very difficult to calculate. And,
surely that is the case with radical decentralization. One
problem is defining the size of the jurisdiction; another is
that a given jurisdiction may go astray; another is that a
spillover, an external benefit of policies, may apply so
widely that one cannot legitimately centralize. However,
I do not think these questions challenge the essential
point. And that is: Are we to accept the government as it
is now-an entire government going astray with every-
body affected-or in the worst case, do we want a nar-
row group of people affected? The object, of course, is
not merely radical decentralization of governmental
functions, but also to keep government to a minimum
size to begin with. I think that radical decentralization
helps to do this, because it limits the possibilities for cost
spreading-for spreading the costs of collectively pro-
vided private benefits around. Second, those who make a
mistake at the local level will bear the cost of making
that mistake. And, third, while I subscribe to Jim
Buchanan's notion of equal liberty, I think that we have
to have some people available all of the time who are de-
parting from that standard, merely to have an example
of what happens when you do depart from it, because I
think that lesson is easily forgotten.
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Liebeler: Could I just get Jim Buchanan's view once more on
the content of that equal liberty?
Buchanan: I'm not sure I can elaborate much more on it. It
seems to me that, if you start arraying liberties, you're on
a diagonal - think of a two-person box and matrix in
which your liberties are arrayed on one side and some-
body else's on the other. Equal liberty requires you to be
on that diagonal: if you have the right to vote, I have the
right to vote; if you have the right to speech, I have the
right to speech; if you have the right to enter a business,
I have the right; if you have the right to enter a contract,
I have the right; if you have a right to secede, I have the
right.
V. JURISDICTIONAL CLAIMS VERSUS THE CLAIMS OF LIBERTY
Butler: I endorse Peter Aranson's notion of decentralization,
and I confess that I do so because it will make efficient
central planning much more difficult-whether that
planning be by Posnerian judges, in whom I have abso-
lutely no confidence, or by legislators learned in welfare
economics, in whom I have also absolutely no confi-
dence. If somehow the decentralized jury becomes tyran-
nical in its balancing-inclined to make interpersonal
comparisons on a micro level-then the decentralized
nature of the jurisdiction would make it easier for the
individual simply to move to a more liberal jurisdiction.
The Founding Fathers talked often about the critical
right to immigrate to different states to seek freedom,
whether it be religious or economic freedom.
Ron Cass suggested that juries are more apt to run
away, and so that it would be easier to handicap a judge.
I disagree. I think it would be much easier to handicap a
jury. When we become a member of society, we are not
free to park our pickup truck wherever we want. We im-
pliedly submit to certain social norms. If our conduct is
judged by that society, it is much easier to predict
whether or not what we want to do really is in accord
with the reasonable expectations of our neighbors.
Therefore, when we choose to live where we do, we do
so in part because we feel relatively confident that a jury
of our peers will agree that what we want to do is a rea-
sonable extension of the implied terms of our local social
compact.
The difficulty I have with Posnerian judges or other
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centralized bodies invoking broad efficiency notions to
justify the imposition of uncompensated losses on indi-
viduals is that human dignity and the micro-efficiencies
that support it get balanced out of the equation. Micro-
efficiencies have been sacrificed on a mammoth scale in
our society on the basis of abstract, high-level notions of
macro-efficiency. It is part of the Keynesian phenomenon
that any individual act, even something as ostensibly vir-
tuous as putting money under your mattress and saving
it, can be recharacterized as, somehow, in the aggregate,
violating the public welfare. I don't like the idea that
Posnerian judges can say: We agree with the legislature
that there is a macro-efficiency concept involved here
that justifies this act. Instead, let a jury decide whether
or not there is a sufficiently compelling and perceptible
macro efficiency involved to justify the imposition of un-
compensated sacrifice on their neighbor. The jury is able
to put themselves in the shoes of this neighbor, and ask
themselves conscientiously: Is this uncompensated sacri-
fice consistent with our societal norms of fairness and
justice?
Manne: I think there is a danger of losing some of the bene-
fits of George Butler's idea about the jury by pointing
too much. He doesn't give adequate consideration to the
virtues that Peter Aranson sees in a scheme of decentrali-
zation. And that leads to another question: If we want
decentralization of a certain category of decisions, why
not start fresh rather than be bound by some questiona-
ble history of what was the role of the jury in the seven-
teenth and eighteenth century? It is clear that a lot of
things are very different today than they were in an over-
whelmingly agricultural society of the eighteenth and
early nineteenth century. Therefore, we may very well
want something that would perform the function that I
think some of us see as desirable in George's suggestion,
without being bound to the notion of the jury, and par-
ticularly with all the legal patina that has been attached
to it over centuries.
Komesar: The only problem I have with Peter Aranson's
thoughts on decentralization is that I keep having this
feeling of deja vu. It occurs to me that, after all, this was
the experiment we had with the Articles of Confedera-
tion. We had a small set of jurisdictions which were too
small in one important sense. They were too small in
dealing with questions of tariffs against one another. And
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we had at that point a difficulty associated with the pris-
oner's dilemma. Now, clearly there's a benefit to all juris-
dictions in not imposing tariffs, but if tariffs are imposed,
it's very likely that it's not to the advantage of any given
jurisdiction to withhold from those tariffs. The big prob-
lem is that, as long as you have the possibility of an au-
thority in charge of managing problems, you are going
to run the risk that it will evolve into a larger system,
which is central even though you had hoped it would be
otherwise, and even if it would have been better if it had
not evolved into such a system. What you really have
then is the same problem of difficult decisions, that is,
courts - decision makers - forced to decide intangible
issues and possibly deciding them wrong. You have that
problem if you begin with a desire for decentralization.
Terrell: This notion of equal liberty has some interesting im-
plications. One of them is related to a point raised by
Peter Aranson: the idea that people might want unequal
liberty. Quite the contrary, doesn't our system suggest
that one of its basic tenets is that we are not only to have
liberty, but liberty that has the specific characteristic of
being "inalienable"? That is, have we determined that
we should not be able to trade off liberties for something
else, that we should not be able to opt out of our political
system and its responsibilities? Presently, of course, there
are many basic liberties that are, in fact, inalienable; for
example, we are not permitted to sell ourselves into slav-
ery. Do we think of liberty as thus being different from
property, which in most instances is salable? I argued in
my paper that property, properly understood, is a kind
of subset of liberty. That is, if liberty is a set of rights,
then property is also a set of rights associated with trade-
able things. Property and liberty are, in fact, very closely
related, and to see them as distinct entities entirely is to
make a very fundamental conceptual error.
This observation then has implications concerning
the notion of equal liberty. If you accept the idea of
equal liberty, and property is a subset of liberty, then
perhaps you are also arguing for equal property. But this
would be a conceptual error as well, as any analysis dem-
onstrates. Liberty is about choice, and if equal liberty is
about equal choice, then property in such a system would
be about equal choice concerning our things - but it
would not require equal things. Thus, the notion of
equal liberty would not, in fact, lead toward some sort of
19851
JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY
redistribution.
Wallin: Two things were going through my mind when I read
the paper on the jury. One was just the novelty of the
concept. The other question was: Is he right historically?
And frankly, I haven't come to a conclusion on that. But
even if George Butler is right about the jury, I still want
to know how they're going to vote, whether they're go-
ing to come up with conclusions that I'm inclined to like
better than the ones we get from judges now. We use the
word "liberty," but I believe that others are more in-
clined to use the word "right," and this may foul the
water. Let's say that Congress decides to cut back on the
welfare state. Someone comes into court and says: I've
been living this way for seven years; I have a certain life-
style based upon it; I get a certain check every month;
it's my expectation that I will continue to receive it. Yet
the people of the United States have elected a legislature
and a president who decide to start cutting this back.
What's the jury going to decide in that case?
Ellis: Well, I want to go back to pick up on Peter Aranson's
plea for radical decentralization. I find myself, I admit,
both attracted and repelled by the notion, and it often
depends on the issue. The question of centralization or
decentralization is not one that can be answered in the
abstract; it must be answered depending on the issue,
such as the organization of the industry in question. In
some industries, we're better off if we have national
firms; in others, we're better off if we have smaller local
firms. But whereas the market can decide the issue with
regard to industry, we need some other mechanism,
some non-market mechanism, when talking about gov-
ernmental decision making. To what extent do we need
national or centralized decision making in order to pro-
mote the national common market, in recognition of the
fact that we have a movement of people and of goods
that cut across political jurisdictions? The regulation of
taxicabs is a phenomenon of decentralized decision mak-
ing. That is the kind of results one gets with decentral-
ized decision making, and like the California Grape
Board, it's a situation where the local decision makers
are in a position to capture some rents from people who
are outside their jurisdiction and who are not in a posi-
tion directly to influence the decision-making. But I do
think that we have tilted the balance excessively in the
direction of centralized decision-making. The framers
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were, in fact, trying to sort out in the Constitution a
mechanism for allocating decisions between centralized
and decentralized decision-making. They may or may not
have intended the court to be the decision-making body,
but what we have seen is that the mechanism they
worked out appears to have failed in that the restrictions,
such as interstate commerce regulation, seem to have be-
come a nullity; and the federal government recognizes
no bars to regulating. But even decentralized decision-
making, without some kind of constraint to protect lib-
erty, is still going to result in a continual process of re-
ducing individual liberty.
Cass: I want to come back to something that I think is close
to the core of the discussion about liberty, and that is my
freedom to read James Joyce or to have access to it. Is
there some reason why we should treat my liberty to
read James Joyce differently than the liberty of those
around me to keep me from reading him? One of the
phenomena that we've gotten out of local regulation
time and again is a freedom to oppress, not just a free-
dom to have access to different things. It may be that,
even though the market works in the sense of allowing
people to vote with their feet and to go places where
most of their preferences can be satisfied, it's not a per-
fect market. At any rate, I think the solutions regarding
the notion of equal liberty require that we treat all pref-
erences alike; and that includes preferences to oppress
others as well as preferences to be free from oppression.
Gelihorn: I wanted to raise a question about Peter Aranson's
solution of decentralization. I think, in-part, that Peter's
is a romantic notion to try to apply 18th-century solu-
tions to a 20th-century society. I'm not going to suggest
that I would disagree completely with the idea of decen-
tralization, but I'm not certain it applies everywhere. I
think we have a very different community. Transporta-
tion and communications are very different today; and as
a consequence, I pay much more attention, for example,
to elections at the national level than I do to those at the
local level. In part, that is an end result of giving deci-
sional power to the national level, but also it is because I
am more interested perhaps in broader questions than in
the location of dry waste or the grading of streets. One
of the problems is that we have structured our communi-
cations, particularly television, to focus on national is-
sues, because the three networks get their share of the
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market only by focusing on larger issues. A question I
would raise in connection with the focus on decentraliza-
tion of the selection of juries is that it certainly does in-
crease the transaction cost of using public bodies to cre-
ate private goods; and in light of our communications
and transportation mechanisms, it's also harder to ob-
serve what's going on. I would suggest that, if we were to
go more toward a regional approach, at least the costs
that are imposed by regulation might be more readily
identified, followed, and observed, and thereby attacked.
I don't want to suggest that I would necessarily favor re-
gionalism, but at least I want to raise the question about
the so-called desirability of the local community.
Finally, I want to focus on the issue of institutional-
ism and suggest the importance of doctrine in our inter-
pretation of the Constitution. I have serious questions
about the utility of the jury as the mechanism to get deci-
sions correct, at least if it is a Cleveland jury. I've spent
time observing them, the way we have constructed them,
how they are selected, who is excluded, and who's willing
to participate. It seems to me we couldn't devise a better
system to find the lowest common denominator. I would
almost call it "institutionalized mob rule." And that ap-
plies certainly in the economic area of plaintiff's antitrust
juries. There is something institutionally inadequate in
the jury system to decide these questions. The jury is
constructed to decide individual facts-adjudicative
facts-of who did what to whom where, why, and how.
It is not good at deciding policy questions-legislative
facts--which are dependent upon expertise, study, and
hearing economists out.
Now, I certainly don't want to be understood as sug-
gesting that the administrative regulatory body is the
sole vehicle for decision making, because I am not at all
confident that it is the solution. I would be much more
enamored of using the legislatures-and, indeed,
judges-in that respect, because I think they are more
effective in the dispassionate type hearing than are juries.
The answer is in the institutional structural mechanisms
requiring that decisions be made on a shared power ba-
sis. We need, primarily, to limit the potential exercise of
arbitrary power by government vis-a-vis the individual.
Therefore, I would look to doctrines that try to foster
that. I have always liked the proposal of requiring the
judicial review of statutes that have wide public applica-
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tion-forcing debate in the courts or in some body of
what are the public goods or goals that are being
achieved versus the private ones. It would force the is-
sues out into the open, and that would be an enormous
forward step. It seems to me that this would be a realistic
mechanism to get at the question of protecting individual
liberty and that it might be more fruitful than efforts to
totally restructure our government and go towards de-
centralized approaches.
Aranson: I cannot resist the temptation to say that I find the
Articles of Confederation a wholly adequate document
for governance. Our Founders gathered to amend them,
and as it turned out, they pulled the wool over our eyes.
Many of the supposed evils of the Articles, including the
alleged widespread production of tariffs, may have been
a myth. People can and will bargain out mutually agree-
able arrangements, and there was nothing under the Ar-
ticles that prevented that bargaining. There really were
not serious problems. (Even under the present constitu-
tional arrangement, the courts have been very weak in
preventing problems stemming from taxation and tariff
arrangements. As I read the interstate tax cases, they pay
less attention to economic incidence and more to exami-
nation of the language of the state statutes at issue.)
I emphasize that I do not claim that decentralization
will cure cancer. It is not a panacea, nor is it an abso-
lutely perfect arrangement. No institution is. But, much
of the criticism of decentralization is derived either from
inapposite kinds of comparisons or from a failure to rec-
ognize the historical record.
Wheeler: I am slightly incredulous that one might wish to res-
urrect the Articles of Confederation. This is the system
that divided geographical entities into irrational time
zones, that taxed the movement of commerce literally on
the basis of what the traffic would allow, and that made it
exceedingly difficult for even a relatively unsophisticated
society such as that of the 18th-century America to oper-
ate on anything like an efficient basis. The constitutional
conventions were not simply assemblages of ideologues;
they were meetings by some hard-nosed pragmatists who
knew they were charged with correcting a flawed system,
a system that recognizably threatened the coherent con-
duct of government.
Admittedly, the road from Philadelphia has been a
long one, and I am as unhappy as the next person at
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what I see as unhealthy and often unjustifiable tenden-
cies toward too much centralization. But the solution, at
least regarding individual liberty, would seem to lie along
the path of establishing an agenda to correct some of the
wrong turns we have taken rather than in attempting to
return to the starting point. I certainly do not think it a
misreading of the historical record to say that the gov-
ernment of the Articles was one of inertia, provencial-
ism, confusion, and a good deal of neglect of real liberty.
Komesar: Let's assume for the moment that one ought to have
decentralization. I see certain advantages to that - not
that decisions will be good or bad but rather that there
will be a mechanism to discipline those decisions. The
question I have is: How will you write your Constitution?
One way is to have an entity which defines geographical
jurisdictions over time and has continuing discretion to
do so. Another way would be to define all jurisdictions in
specific terms and not leave it for future discretion.
That, of course, has the difficulty of not being flexible
enough to meet changes in circumstances. If you look at.
the Constitution, oddly enough, the framers did have in-
stances in which they wanted to take decisions away from
future decision makers altogether. Now, many of us be-
lieve that there are many less than specific phrases in the
Constitution, which were meant to divide the decision
making process among future decision makers and not
make it all legislative. But there is the choice as to who
will decide: Will it be those writing the initial document,
in which case it has to be specific; or will there be an
assignment to a future entity, in which case you run into
problems with imperfections in the defining institutions.
Aranson: There are several mechanisms to use in addressing
Neil Komesar's question - and, again, not all of them
are perfect. The simplest way is to leave things alone and
to allow secession by simple majority, with the provision
of the development of a common law of interjurisdic-
tional externalities. In other words, if Sandy Springs,
Georgia, wants to secede from Fulton County, then we
get our neighbors together and we so vote. If we get,
say, two-thirds of the votes, we would secede. Then,
Fulton County might say: You own some of our prop-
erty, some of our schools, and so forth. And, if it could
not be bargained out, we go into court and make some
kind of an allocation, depending upon how much in taxes
Sandy Springs has paid. Having done that, for example,
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you would probably find that Fulton County owed Sandy
Springs money.
Morgan: I suggest that whatever we assume the constitutional
agreement to be, it has to be something that we would all
agree makes us better off. It has to be a notion, in which
we all agreed to give up some of our total freedom in
exchange for the ability to take freedom from others
sometimes, whether by super-majorities or some other
mechanism. That leads us, I suggest, to the proposition:
How much is too much taking of liberty? And, ulti-
mately, that question becomes an institutional one of
who decides. As Lino Graglia has said, it really comes
down to what decision you would snicker up your sleeve
at. There is a whole range of regulation: some is liberty-
intrusive and some is less so. Which brings you to the
question of who decides which is which. I also agree that
you are going to have some liberty-intrusive decisions on
the local level. The question is: Are you going to have
fewer of them at that level and are you going to be able
to deal with them better than you might have otherwise?
In response to Ernie Gellhorn's point on the juries
being institutionalized mob rule, there is always the pos-
sibility that juries have a less than a perfect understand-
ing of all the questions which they might be forced to
address. But judges aren't perfect either; and judges
have a substantial interest, whether institutional or per-
sonal, in being assertive. I have not seen that judges are
wiser or less intrusive or less willing to tolerate a state
invasion of individual rights, at least in the economic
area, than juries might be. I don't know if there is any
specific basis for saying for sure whether a legislature, a
jury, or a judge is most likely to be liberty-protective, but
it ought to be explored.
Harriss: One of the questions I want to raise is, what are the
implications of the ability of a person to set up a
perpetuity which has effects throughout endless time if
the investment is successful? How does that square with
the issue of equality? As for the question of decentraliza-
tion, I was on one of President Reagan's committees that
tried to deal with this issue. One of the reasons that it
failed was that it could not find perfection. No plan de-
vised - and the computers ran off dozens of them, at-
tempting to match responsibilities and revenue sources
- could satisfy everyone who had some influence. Re-
member, every state has two senators; and this fact
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presents a real problem. My guess is that we will con-
tinue to talk about decentralization, as will our grand
children, but that not much will happen.
Butler: Peter Aranson's preference for the Articles of Con-
federation leaves out of account what Alexander Hamil-
ton perceived as perhaps the biggest single benefit of the
Constitution, namely the ability of the federal govern-
ment under the new Constitution to tax individuals di-
rectly and not to be beholden to requisitions from the
States to finance real public goods like national defense.
In the Federalist Papers, Hamilton noted that a lot of
discontent with the Constitution centered around the po-
tential denial of a civil jury in tax collection cases. He
countered with the observation that a lot of the states
deny the right to a jury in such cases-with the clear im-
plication that states' rightists who criticized the Constitu-
tion on this score were hypocrites. Another early writer,
Saint George Tucker, wrote in his 1803 edition of Black-
stone that you should have a right to a jury in a tax col-
lection case. Tucker also made the point, and it responds
to Ernie Gellhorn's observation, that the only trouble
with juries was that they were being sabotaged by the
legislatures, which don't like them and therefore un-
derfund them. According to Tucker, juries provide a
wonderful public good-that is, individualized justice,
hence we shouldn't impose a disproportionate sacrifice
on jurors in the provision of this public good. If we want
justice, we should pay for it. Tucker concludes that ju-
rors need to be better funded. If we re-adopt the liberta-
rian model of the jury, we will get better results, I sug-
gest, not only because juries would be better paid, they
would also be better instructed. Judges will no longer
treat the jury disdainfully-as a rubber stamp. They
would have to treat the jury with a great deal more con-
sideration, both because the jury would be more repre-
sentative, which better pay will help ensure, and because
the judge would have to advise the jury: The ultimate
decision is yours, but I respectfully suggest to you that
the best view of the law is as I am giving it to you. As a
result, jury trials would be a much more invigorating ex-
ercise, because you would have a genuine democratic dia-
logue on the mature of the social compact.
Manne: I think we have to put to rest any notion of the zero-
transaction-cost system government. Also, it seems that
we have got to start off with the same kinds of notions
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that economists have traditionally used. And that is, eve-
rybody has a certain degree of freedom - in the sense
of having some choices. Now, people are going to make
the choice that they want some government; they are not
going to opt for anarchy. As soon as they opt for govern-
ment, they implicitly agree that they are going to make
an arrangement with the governors. Too often, we sit
around complaining bitterly about the way these people
in government are behaving. That is very silly talk.
These are people who have elected to make their living
being government officials. The point is that, in focusing
on ultimate ideals, states of nature, and the improve-
ments we are going to make in government or in human
liberty, we must take into account the here and now, the
existing distribution of power - or, as I would view
them, property rights, properly conceived. At any given
moment, everybody faces some transactions costs, people
in government, people out of government. It is not
worth it to me to go out and devote my life to stirring up
a revolution to get rid of some Supreme Court cases I
don't like or the FDA or the FTC. All we can really
achieve is tiny incremental or marginal movements to-
wards individual liberty.
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